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INTRODUCTION
Our students suspect that we secretly enjoy imposing the difficulty
of civil procedure on our classes.' Our colleagues portray us as re-
luctant to challenge the foundations of our specialty.2 The suspi-
cion is uncharitable, and the portrait is incomplete. 3 Even so, we
who study civil procedure may sometimes carry out our work in
ways that give credence to such thoughts. Take, for example, the
scholarly contribution to the development of the Erie doctrine. 4
Erie scholarship nowadays follows an established pattern. The
rule that federal courts sitting in diversity actions will apply state
substantive law is accepted as an axiom, and the debate then shifts
to an analysis of the principles that should guide courts in choosing
between state and federal procedure in specific situations. 5 Only in-
1. Law review editors who require a cite to authority for this statement demonstrate
incontrovertibly that they have suppressed their darkest memories about first year civil
procedure.
2. SeeJohn H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693,698 (1974) ("[To
one accustomed to the savagery of constitutional criticism, writers on procedure seem
strangely, if refreshingly, accepting.").
3. It must be said, however, that the unfortunate image of civil procedure professors as
unusually deviant even among law professors is sometimes furthered by our own statements.
See Abram Chayes, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Bead Came, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 753
(1974) ("There should be some reason, beyond the (perhaps perverse) delight in the intricacy
of the game.").
4. The doctrine takes its name from the case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), in which the Supreme Court held that federal district courts would thereafter apply
state substantive law, except in questions governed by the Federal Constitution or federal
statutes. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In doing so, the Supreme Court,
abolished something called "federal general common law," to distinguish it from other forms
of federal common law that still exist. Id.; see infra notes 119 and 209 (listing circumstances
under which federal courts may establish common law).
5. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Erie' Mid-life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1141-42 (1989)
(opposing use of Erie's progeny to avoid legitimate state policies); Kurt M. Saunders, Plying the
Erie Waters: Choice of Law in the Deterrence of Frivolous Appeals, 21 GA. L. REV. 653, 721-22 (1987)
(applying Erie to choice of law on issue of frivolous appeals); Peter Westen &Jeffrey S. Leh-
man, Is There Lifefor Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MicH. L. REV. 311, 388-89 (1980)
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frequently is there even a hint that the Erie doctrine has outlived its
usefulness or that, on balance, it should not have been adopted in
the first place. 6
The difficulties of mastering the application of Erie are well known
to those who study it.7 The superficial simplicity of a rule some-
times requiring federal courts to apply state law becomes, on closer
examination, a swamp of confusion that can trap everyone from
legal neophytes to the most astute of federal judges.8 That a doc-
trine so uncertain in application should remain in place for half a
century might suggest that, its weaknesses notwithstanding, the doc-
trine contributed importantly to our law-or, at least, that no better
alternative to the doctrine existed. 9 It is the thesis of this Article
that those assumptions now rest on shaky ground. In fact, the expe-
rience of the half century since Erie has substantially undermined
much of the constitutional and policy foundations on which Erie
rests and has cast doubt on the doctrine's ability to provide benefits
comparable with its costs.
The Article starts by examining the background of Erie, beginning
with the Supreme Court's rejection of Swift v. Tyson, 10 which estab-
lished the doctrine Erie overturned. It discusses the changes Erie
imposed, along with the explanations the Supreme Court offered
for overruling Swift. Those explanations are then examined in light
of current thinking about constitutional requirements and public
policy that may bear on Erie. The Article compares costs Erie im-
poses with the benefits it was supposed to produce. The Article
concludes that Erie, as currently applied, is not mandated constitu-
tionally and that the costs of continued adherence to the doctrine
are difficult to justify on policy grounds. The recommendation that
follows is simple to state, though difficult to swallow: Swift should
be viewed as a preferred alternative.
(analyzing misconceptions regarding choice of state or federal law in diversity cases to con-
clude that Erie principles also bear on federal and state law in non-diversity cases); John D.
Brummett, Jr., Note, The Preclusive Effect of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States and Fed-
eral Choice of Law: The Rule of the Erie Doctrine Reassessed, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 83, 109 (1988)
("[W]hen a federal-diversity court recognizes a foreign-country judgment, the Erie doctrine
does not compel it to determine the judgment's preclusive effect by referring to the choice-of-
preclusion law rules of the state in which it is sitting.").
6. There was a time when criticism of Erie was a bit more common. See ArthurJ. Keeffe
et al., Weary Erie, 34 CORN. L.Q. 494 (1949) (citing growing criticism of Erie). The authors
detected "faint rumblings of discontent directed at applications and interpretations of the Erie
doctrine," but those rumblings never became an earthquake. Id at 494.
7. See id at 514 (noting plethora of opinions interpreting Erie).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 250-51 (discussing costs of Erie including difficulty
encountered by students in understanding material).
9. See Keeffe et al., supra note 6, at 1 (classifying dependence upon Erie as grounded in
pure faith).
10. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Swift v. Tyson
Erie was a reaction to a doctrine that had been settled for nearly a
century." In Swift, a case initiated in federal court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction, 12 the dispute centered on whether satisfaction
of a preexisting debt was consideration sufficient to entitle the
holder of a note to the status of holder in due course.' 3 The appli-
cable state law (if it was applicable) was that of New York.14 Justice
Story, writing for the Court, rejected one line of New York cases
suggesting that cancellation of a preexisting debt was not valuable
consideration as understood in the law of negotiable instruments.' 5
Justice Story's motive in rejecting those cases may have had more
to do with a desire to enforce uniformity in the negotiable-instru-
ment law of the various states than with principles of federalism, 6
but the consequences of his reach for authority to disregard state
commercial law were profound. In a single lengthy paragraph ex-
tending over nearly two pages of the opinion, Justice Story con-
cluded that the statute, now known as the Rules of Decision Act,1 7
did not require federal courts to follow the common law of the
states.18
Justice Story's reasoning is especially interesting because it later
became a focal point of attacks on the Swift doctrine itself.' 9 Justice
Story wrote that the Act's command to use the "laws" of the states
where not prohibited by federal authority did not require federal
courts to apply state common law.20 Thus the Court adopted the
rule that, when federal courts hear diversity cases, they must follow
state statutes and the construction given them by local courts, but
11. See TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SwiFr & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 101 (1981) (noting Swift's acceptance for 96 years).
12. The federal diversity jurisdiction statute is currently found at 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1988).
13. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 15-18 (1842).
14. Id. at 15 (restating defendant's argument that because acceptance occurred in New
York, court should treat contract as New York contract, governed by New York laws).
15. Id. at 17-18 (commenting that local tribunals do not furnish conclusive authority to
bind Supreme Court).
16. See FRYER, supra note 11, at 36 (concluding that central question in Swift v. Tyson
involved commercial law rather than federal-state relationships).
17. At the time Swfi was decided, the controlling statute was section 34 of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789. Today, the modem version of that act, now entitled the Rules of Deci-
sion Act, is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
18. Swift, 41 U.S. at 12-13.
19. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of Swift opinion).
20. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 18 ("In the ordinary course of language, it will hardly be con-
tended, that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what
the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws.").
[Vol. 41:1087
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that they need not feel bound by state judicial decisions that do not
interpret legislative acts.2 1
B. The Attack on Swift
Swift was controlling law for nearly a century; but the Supreme
Court struck it down with a single blow. 22 Writing for the majority
in Erie, Justice Brandeis offered a broad range of reasons for the
Court's drastic step:
First, in holding that the Rules of Decision Act authorized federal
courts hearing diversity cases to disregard state common law, Swift
had misconstrued the Act;23
Second, Swift failed to develop the more uniform state law that its
proponents had anticipated;24
Third, Swift created new uncertainties in law because lower courts
trying to apply Swift were often unsure whether a given issue should
be tried under federal or state law;2
5
Fourth, by creating the possibility that a federal court hearing a
diversity case might apply law different than that which would be
applied by a state court hearing the same case in the same state,
Swift offered to plaintiffs whose citizenship was diverse from defend-
ants the opportunity to select between the law the federal court
would use and the state common law, to the obvious detriment of
defendants. 26 Thus, as the Court in Erie saw it, diversity jurisdic-
tion, originally intended to protect out-of-state litigants against un-
fair play in their opponents' home state courts, became an
instrument by which diversity plaintiffs could unfairly disadvantage
defendants. 27 Moreover, Justice Brandeis found, the inequity was
magnified by the ease with which a plaintiff seeking the benefit of
federal law under Swift could invoke diversity jurisdiction simply by
changing the state of residence. 28 Similarly, without making a physi-
21. Id. Swift also deferred to state law when the issue involved rights and titles to things
with permanent locality, such as real estate, and other immovable and intra-territorial matters.
Id.
22. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938). See FREYER, supra note 11, at xi
(noting that after 96 years, Erie reversed Swift).
23. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72.
24. Id. at 74 (remarking that state court persistence in postulating upon common law
prevented uniformity).
25. Id. (theorizing that demarcation of boundaries between general federal law and local
state law is impossible task).
26. See id. at 74-75 (describing possibility of forum shopping as contrary to aims of equal
protection).
27. Id. at 74-75. The Court also noted the possibility that a nonresident plaintiff, de-
feated on a point of law in a state's highest court, could nonetheless win by taking nonsuit and
renewing the controversy in federal court. Id at 75 n.9.
28. Id. at 76.
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cal change of residence, a corporate citizen could benefit from the
rule by simply reincorporating under the laws of another state.29
Fifth, and according to Justice Brandeis, most important, the ma-
jority in Erie believed Swift was unconstitutional.30 The Court noted
that, its longevity notwithstanding, the presence of unconstitutional-
ity rather than mere statutory construction compelled abandonment
of the Swift doctrine.3'
Gradually a few other rationales justifying Erie's displacement of
Swift have grown from the Court's original list of Swift's shortcom-
ings.32 Such arguments, if sound, offer additional support for the
majority's action in Erie, and they must be considered in turn. The
first duty of an Erie skeptic, however, is to demonstrate why the rea-
sons originally offered for Erie are either ill-founded or, at least, out
of date. If the Court's original explanations can still be supported,
there is little point in questioning the validity of Erie by criticizing its
more recent justifications. Thus, this Article now examines more
closely the criticisms Justice Brandeis offered of Swift, and demon-
strates the fragility of the Erie majority's position. Then the Article
examines the more recently developed theories supporting Erie and
shows how the doctrine should not be sustained on those alternative
grounds.
III. QUESTIONING THE ERIE CRITICISMS OF SWIFT
A. Construing the Rules of Decision Act
In holding that the Rules of Decision Act did not authorize federal
courts hearing diversity cases to create common law separate from
that of the states, Justice Brandeis expressly relied on the research
and conclusions of Charles Warren.33 That dependence raises a
question not usually addressed in analyses of Erie: how reliable was
Warren's research?
The short answer is that, in an important respect, its reliability is
essentially unquestioned.34 Warren was a scholar of the first magni-
29. Id. at 76-77 (citing similar occurrence in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1928)).
30. Id. at 77-78.
31. See id. at 74-75 (finding Swift too easily manipulated and allowing "grave discrimina-
tion by noncitizens against citizens").
32. See infra text accompanying notes 242-44 (discussing flaws inherent in Erie).
33. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-74 nn.5 & 8. The Court cited several of Warren's works, includ-
ing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciay Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV.
49 (1923) [hereinafter Warren, New Light] and 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME, COURT IN
UNrrED STATES HISTORY (1935). The most influential of these appears to have been New Light.
34. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HAIRv. L. REv.
883, 903-04 (1986) (stating that Court in Erie simply accepted conclusion of Warren).
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tude, and it would be in bad taste to suggest that his research would
reflect anything but a careful and honest approach to his sources.
At another level, however, it remains fair to identify the predisposi-
tions Warren brought to his work.
Even the best and most honorable historians are still human be-
ings, subject to the same sort of biases and other limitations charac-
teristic of our species. Thus historians may establish total
objectivity as a legitimate goal toward which they should strive, but
they may not expect to achieve it completely. Instead, their duty is
to try to be as fair and honest with their sources as they can be. If,
like the rest of us, historians still possess their personal biases, they
have an additional duty to disclose them so that their readers can
take such predispositions into account.
In that sense, Warren was faithful to his duty. Throughout the
article that was so important to the decision in Erie, Warren forth-
rightly argued his own view of the proper relationship between fed-
eral and state courts in our judicial system. 35 His discussion and
proposals help explain the bias he brought to the issue of the proper
authority of federal courts hearing diversity cases to deviate from
state common law.3
6
It is an understatement to say that Warren's general view of feder-
alism was that federal courts, below the level of the Supreme Court,
should have almost no role to play. For example, consider the other
proposals Warren made in the same article in which he argued that
federal courts were without authority to deviate from state common
law under the Rules of Decision Act.
1. Treating corporations as citizens enables corporations to use
diversity jurisdiction to gain unfair legal advantage. "No single
factor has given rise to more friction and jealousy between State
and Federal Courts, or to more State legislation conflicting with
and repugnant to Federal jurisdiction, than has the doctrine of
citizenship for corporations. And this diverse citizenship jurisdic-
tion created by the Constitution ... has resulted in putting for-
eign corporations in a more favorable situation than domestic
corporations, sued in a state."
3 7
2. Statutes authorizing removal of cases from state to federal
35. See Warren, New Light, supra note 33, at 132 (advocating reducing power of federal
district courts by allowing state courts to hear cases involving federal statutes).
36. Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Com-
mon Law: A General Approach, 71 CORN. L. REV. 733, 760 n. 116 (1986) (discussing Warren's
efforts to have Swift reversed). Professor Burbank characterizes Warren's conclusion as in-
volving pure speculation, rhetorically useful in aid of the author's effort to demonstrate that
the Court erred in Swift. Id.
37. Warren, New Light, supra note 33, at 90. Attempts to cut off corporate access to fed-
eral courts predated Warren's article by at least halfa century. See FREYER, supra note 11, at 79
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court should be scaled back dramatically. In particular, Warren
advocated repeal of the removal authority established in the Re-
construction Era of American history, reasoning that "there is
now [in 1923] little danger that the State Court will not amply
protect persons claiming Federal rights."
3 8
3. Diversity jurisdiction should be reduced or abolished.3 9
4. Federal question jurisdiction in the district courts should be
drastically reduced and, at the same time, jurisdiction of state
courts to hear federal questions should be enlarged.
40
To call Warren conservative is to misunderstand him. He was not
advocating a status quo or a return to the federal judicial system as
it had existed at any point in his lifetime.4 1 In fact, his proposals
would have slashed the authority of federal district courts to a stub-
ble not recognizable to students of law living at any time in the cen-
tury before Warren wrote. He was, in short, a proponent of states'
judicial rights who tolerated only the barest authority for federal
courts inferior to the Supreme Court.42 His criticism of Swift was
only part of a larger mosaic directed toward that end.
Warren's view of the role of federal courts does not impugn the
integrity of his research. It should, however, help us understand
that in making interpretations and drawing conclusions, Warren
would have been an extraordinary scholar indeed if he had not been
affected by his profound predispositions against a significant federal
judiciary. Thus, it is fair to keep in mind that when Warren reached
a conclusion, he may not have weighed evidence tending to contro-
vert his position as strongly as he might have, had his predisposi-
tions been in favor of a stronger federal judiciary.
With that in mind, two additional points need to be made. First
the Erie majority, in the end, did not depend heavily on Warren's
analysis of the Act in reaching its conclusion. 43 As Justice Brandeis
wrote, "[I]f only a question of statutory construction were involved,
(referring to 1875 bill designed to deny corporations right to initiate suits in federal court or
remove suits from state court).
38. Warren, New Light, supra note 33, at 92.
39. Id. at 132 (advocating state court hearing of cases involving citizens and non-citi-
zens). Of course, Warren was neither the first nor the last to propose abolition of diversity
jurisdiction. See FREYER, supra note 11, at 105 (pointing to criticism and legislation designed
to abolish diversity jurisdiction following reaffirmation of Swift in 1928).
40. Warren, New Light, supra note 33, at 132.
41. See id' (proposing changes which would expand state court jurisdiction beyond pre-
federalism levels).
42. Id Promoting increased jurisdiction for state courts, Warren proposed that cases
which may be considered by the Supreme Court on appeal or writ of error be reduced by a
"determined effort to cut off these cases, not at the Supreme Court end but at the District
Court end; in other words by turning the stream of cases at their source, out of the District
Court conduit, and into and through the state courts." Id. (emphasis in original).
43. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (attributing abandonment of Swift to
[Vol. 41:1087
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we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century."' 44 Second, there is some indication
that Warren's conclusions were not necessarily compelling, even at
the time of Erie.45 Justice Holmes, who relied on Warren's work in
an earlier dissent that criticized Swift, concluded only that Warren
"probably" established an error of statutory construction in Swift.4 6
One scholar's solid proof was only evidence to another, even an-
other similarly inclined.
47
The central question about construction of the Rules of Decision
Act, however, is one that can be more simply stated. Even if Warren
was right that the Act did not permit federal district courts to create
common law separate from that of the states, it does not follow that
the district courts need still be disabled from following the path that
Swift laid out. As demonstrated later in this Article, there appears to
be no constitutional disability limiting the power of Congress to
amend the Rules of Decision Act to permit federal courts to create
federal common law in the Swift mold.48
B. Swift's "Failure" to Achieve Uniformity
It has long been accepted that an important goal underlying Swift
was the desire of the Supreme Court to ensure a degree of uniform-
ity in state law, at least in commercial transactions. 49 Thus when
Justice Brandeis claimed, with ample citations to authority, that Swift
had failed to establish uniformity in state law, 50 he was not making a
criticism that is easily dismissed. Whether the criticism carries the
day, however, is another matter.
Of necessity, the influence Swift was to have on state common law
unconstitutionality); Keeffe et al., supra note 6, at 495-96 (discussing finding of Swift's
unconstitutionality).
44. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77.
45. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing Swift and Justice Story's
reasoning).
46. Id It should be noted, however, that Justice Holmes did not propose to abolish
Swift. "I should leave Swift v. Tyson undisturbed .... but I would not allow it to spread the
assumed dominion into new fields." Id.
47. Compare Warren, New Light, supra note 33, at 51 (deciding that Swift would have been
decided differently in light of later discovered evidence) with Black & White, 276 U.S. at 535
(holding that Warren's evidence probably established error) and Burbank, supra note 36, at
760 n. 116 (characterizing Warren's claim as speculation).
48. See infra notes 189-215 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of con-
gressional action designed to permit federal courts to establish federal common law).
49. See FREYER, supra note 11, at 19-22 (delineating problems of injustice and partiality in
state courts as justifying need for uniformity).
50. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (citing cases with conflicting interpretations of common law).
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had to be indirect.5 1 Even if the federal courts did have the right to
create common law at odds with that of the states, Swift never as-
serted that state judicial precedent contradicting federal general
common law would simply be disregarded. 52 Justice Story wrote
that decisions of the local tribunals should receive "the most delib-
erate attention and respect" of the Supreme Court.53 In that sense,
all Swift represented was an alternative body of law to which litigants
could resort.
Over time, however, Swift might reasonably have been expected
indirectly to encourage state courts to adopt the views of common
law that developed in the federal courts. If the state courts did not
acquiesce, some of the cases that might have been brought in state
court would instead be initiated in (or removed to) federal court by
the party that would be advantaged through application of federal
general common law. 54 It was this indirect influence that was ex-
pected to move the state courts toward federal general common
law. 55 At least, that was the theory.
That the practice did not always turn out that way, however,
should not have been surprising. Even at the time of Swift, state
courts already had experience disagreeing with one another; that
was the perceived problem Swift was intended to reduce. Those dif-
ferences occurred, notwithstanding the possibility that in at least
some cases a plaintiff who could obtain personal or quasi in rem
jurisdiction over a defendant in more than one state might seek to
forum shop among the states on the basis of which state offered the
plaintiff the more favorable law. 56 The persistence of differences
between courts of the various states, which must have known that
such differences would encourage forum shopping by some plain-
tiffs, indicates strongly that the courts would not (and will not) bend
readily to a different law simply to avoid disharmony between the
available laws. In other words, there were factors to be considered
beyond harmonizing the differing state laws into one homogenous
51. See FREYER, supra note 11, at 2-4 (noting that Swift's effect on state law was masked by
its characterization as question of commercial law).
52. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 13 (1842) (declaring local court decisions
influential but not binding).
53. Id.
54. FREYER, supra note 11, at 40.
55. See id. (offering theory that presence of alternatives for diverse parties would pro-
mote uniformity).
56. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (commenting on opportunities and ease
with which to conduct forum shopping). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the constitu-
tionality of in personam jurisdiction based solely on service of process on the defendant while
the defendant is within the territorial confines of ajurisdiction. Burnham v. Superior Court,
495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990). The decision enhances a plaintiff's opportunity to choose a forum
based on a determination of which potential forum's law is most favorable to a plaintiff. Id.
[Vol. 41:1087
VITALITY OF ERIE
whole. States whose laws differed from one another were prepared
to accept those differences as part of the price of developing their
own distinct law-each presuming its own variation to be prefera-
ble. That is, at least some disharmony was to be expected.
In that circumstance, it is difficult to see how the Court could real-
istically have justified the Swift decision by suggesting its benefit of
near total uniformity in state common law. The most the doctrine
could have done was to serve as another consideration encouraging
the states to reduce disharmony among their laws. According to
several scholars who made a rather thorough investigation of Swift's
impact on state law,57 the Swift rule promoted uniformity subtly, by
pressuring state courts to "march in harmony with [their] fel-
lows." s5 8 Realistically, and in light of the fact that state courts would
always be free to disagree among themselves as well as with feder-
ally created common law, a subtle effect was all that the Supreme
Court should have expected.
C. Swift Introduced New Uncertainties
Justice Brandeis offered two foundations for his assessment that
increased uncertainties had developed because Swift was unable to
create a clear distinction between circumstances when federal gen-
eral common law would displace state common law.59 The first
source was again Charles Warren who remarked that the Swift deci-
sion, rather than promote uniformity, had created uncertainty as
businessmen were unable to predict whether the doctrine would af-
fect their legal disputes. 60 The second source was the Federal Di-
gest through 1937, which Justice Brandeis said "lists nearly 1,000
decisions involving the distinction between questions of general and
of local law."16
1
Warren's assertion, of course, should be read in light of his pre-
57. Keeffe et al., supra note 6, at 500-04. The authors of Weary Erie contend that the
research of Felix Frankfurter, which served as a foundation for Justice Brandeis' contention
that Swift had failed to achieve uniformity in state law, was based on "fragmentary and mis-
leading" evidence. Id. at 504.
Earlier I identified what I perceived to be the intellectual bias of Charles Warren against a
strong role for federal trial courts. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text (discussing
Warren's bias). Elementary fair play requires that I also report that the underlying predispo-
sition of the authors of Weary Erie seems to be strongly in favor of very strong federal courts.
Keeffe et al., supra note 6, at 526-27 (stating federal courts should be given greater authority
to adjudicate).
58. Keeffe et al., supra note 6, at 526-27.
59. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
60. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 89 (1935)
("Probably no decision of the Court has ever given rise to more uncertainty as to legal
rights.").
61. Erie. 304 U.S. at 74 n.8.
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disposition against an important role for federal courts. 62 Neverthe-
less, it is difficult to argue with his assumption that a rule whose
application is not fully understood loses value in proportion to its
uncertainty. The Federal Digest cited by Justice Brandeis provides
evidence that Swift did not lay out a "bright line" dividing federal
and state law.6 3 Swift may well have had a weakness, but that weak-
ness still needs to be seen in a proper context. The proper context
for Swift was not available to either Warren or Justice Brandeis. It
lies before us now, however, in a comparison of the uncertainty of
Swift with the uncertainty of Erie.
1. Slippery "identifications" of state law
There is a basic problem of uncertainty resulting from the appli-
cation of Erie that was not present under Swift: the question of de-
termining state law. Since Erie, there have been many diversity cases
in which the federal court was confident that state law controlled,
but uncertain as to what state law was.64 Nonetheless, under Erie,
the federal court was bound to apply state law. Uncertainty is inher-
ent in this situation.
Two devices-abstention and certification-have been developed
to help federal courts escape the problem. 65 Neither of those ap-
62. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text (examining writings and biases of
Warren).
63. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (pointing to difficulty in developing suitable dividing line
between federal and state law).
64. Judge Friendly's widely quoted comment remains a most penetrating description of
the dilemma this Erie problem creates when it is combined with a question of choosing the law
of a state other than that in which the federal court sits: "Our principal task, in this diversity
of citizenship case, is to determine what the New York courts would think the California
courts would think on an issue about which neither has thought." Nolan v. Transocean Air
Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960).
65. Both abstention and certification operate by turning the difficult question over to
state courts, at least in part. Abstention is the practice by which a federal court, faced with an
uncertain question of state law, simply abstains from deciding the case. See, e.g., United Serv.
Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964)
(recognizing that it is appropriate to stay action in federal court until state court declares law
applicable to and controlling in federal appeal). Under abstention the court will dismiss the
action, forcing the plaintiff to refile the action in state court where the uncertain question can
be resolved definitively. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500
(1941) (finding that last word on meaning of Texas Civil Statutes "belongs neither to us nor
to the district court but to the Supreme Court of Texas.").
Where certification is available, the federal court struggling with state law need not dismiss
the case. Instead, it keeps jurisdiction, but certifies the difficult question to a state court com-
petent to resolve it. See, e.g., In re Sandy Ridge Oil Co., 807 F.2d 1332, 1338 (7th Cir, 1986)
(requesting Supreme Court of Indiana to provide instruction in area where there exists no
clear controlling Indiana Supreme Court precedent). Upon receipt of the state court's deter-
mination, the federal court applies the now established state law and continues with the case.
Obviously, both abstention and certification achieve certitude in establishing the controlling
state law, but potentially at the cost of substantial expense and delay for the litigants,
In an earlier study, Professor Ira Robbins and I developed mixed evidence on the net costs
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proaches, however, is used extensively. 6 6 Much more frequently,
federal courts simply try to determine, unaided, the controlling state
law. All too often, these ventures of federal judges into state law
produce little more than guesswork. Even worse, federal judges
may simply substitute their own view of what state law should be, for
what it actually is67 -sort of an underground exercise in the forbid-
den federal common law. In those cases, Swift has the last laugh:
Charles Warren's hypothetical business people, longing for predict-
of certification. In response to a survey, clerks of courts indicated that certification substan-
tially delayed the disposition of a case. John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certifi-
cation and Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 411,456 (1988). Statejudges who responded to the
survey tended to disagree with the clerks' assessment. Id Federal judges who actually handle
final disposition of certified cases were more inclined to agree with the clerks. Id. Both
groups of judges, however, believed that for many cases the time and expense invested in
certification could be justified by the benefit, in difficult cases, of applying the proper state
law. Id at 455-72.
It is important to note, however, that certification is beneficial to the extent that it alleviates
some of the costs of Erie. If federal courts were free, as they were under Swift, to fashion
federal general common law, there would be little need to weigh the relative merits and costs
of certification because there would be little need to have a certification process of any kind.
66. In fact, the Supreme Court has directed that abstention be employed only infre-
quently in "exceptional circumstances." Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234
(1943). Certification is used more often than abstention, but still not routinely. Committee
on Fed. Courts, Analysis of State Laws Providing for Certification by Federal Courts of Determinative
State Issues of Law, 42 REC. A.B. Crry N.Y. 101, 102 (1987) (noting that cost of certification
suggests that it should be used "sparingly and selectively").
67. See McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 666-67 (3d Cir.) (inter-
preting question of state law while ignoring previous state court interpretations), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 976 (1980). This often-cited medical malpractice case turned on the construction of
Ohio's statute of limitations. A district court in Pennsylvania dismissed the action because
existing Ohio precedent held that the statute began to run when the physician-patient rela-
tionship ended, not when the patient discovered the injury. Id. at 659. A two-judge majority
on the Third Circuit reversed, predicting that Ohio would apply that precedent only to a
determination of the date on which the cause of action arose, and would not apply it to a
situation in which it was necessary to determine when a statute of limitations was tolled. Id. at
666. In dissent, Judge Higginbotham cut to the heart of the problem with such
determinations:
[W]e have been asked here to deliver prematurely a new Ohio statute of limitations
doctrine despite the fact that that concept has been expressly rejected, and recently
so, by every state and federal court in Ohio. I do not claim that the Ohio Supreme
Court's views on when the statute of limitations starts to run in cases such as these
are part of the modem or enlightened trends. But if counsel wants to test whether
Ohio will have more enlightened views on the statute of limitations issues, it is far
better for counsel to litigate those issues in the state courts of Ohio which have the
final say on when their recently expressed views will be repudiated.
Id. at 672 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The Third Circuit may have been more willing to
second guess the district court in McKenna because the trial judge sat in Pennsylvania, and
presumably knew no more about Ohio law than judges of the Third Circuit (which does not
include Ohio). Judge Higginbotham wrote that he was "moved" by the tragedy the plaintiff
suffered and was "convinced" that the tolling rule the majority preferred "is a humane and
desirable component of medical malpractice law." Id. at 669 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
Judge Higginbotham's concern for applying anachronistic law would have been alleviated had
the court been able to fashion the more enlightened law that all three judges preferred. That
course would have been available under Swift, but was theoretically foreclosed by Erie. Pre-
sumably a desire to reach ajust result in the case before the court explains why the two-judge
majority made its rather dubious "prediction" of Ohio's law.
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ability in law,6 8 must still be searching. If uncertainty was a problem
of Swift, Erie clearly has not been the answer.
2. The confusion continues
Perhaps once, when Erie was younger, the uncertainty it engen-
dered might have been explained by the difficulty involved in work-
ing out a novel doctrine. If a doctrine is workable, however, a point
should be achieved at which it has stabilized sufficiently to afford a
degree of predictability in its application. After half a century, that
time has not yet come for Erie. Three Supreme Court decisions in
the last decade reflect the turbulence still afflicting the doctrine.
Walker v. Armco Steel 69 brought the Court back again to questions
about Erie's effect on the use of federal procedure in diversity
cases. 70 Walker was a product liability case in which the complaint
was filed within the statutory time limit, but not served on the de-
fendant until after the limitations period had run.71 Under state
law, the complaint was not timely unless the defendant was served
within the limitations period. 72 The plaintiff, however, argued that
the issue was controlled by Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which marks the commencement of an action when the com-
plaint is filed with the court.7 3 If Rule 3 had controlled, the
plaintiff's action would have been timely when filed with the district
68. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text (examining need for certainty in appli-
cation of legal doctrine).
69. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
70. Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740, 741 (1980) (discussing application of federal
procedure in cases based on diversity jurisdiction). In Erie, Justice Brandeis wrote that,
"[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to
be applied in any case is the law of the state." Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Justice Reed's concurrence
helped make clear that the majority did not intend the new doctrine to prohibit the use of
federal procedure in diversity cases. Id at 92 (Reed, J., concurring). Developments subse-
quent to Erie, however, made the question of using federal procedure in diversity cases con-
siderably more difficult than the Court in Erie may have anticipated.
There are at least three sources of federal civil procedure. The applicability of Erie to vari-
ous rules of procedure depends heavily on the source of the procedure at issue. Some proce-
dure is the product of case law. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202-
03 (1956) (concerning enforceability of agreement requiring arbitration prior to trial). Deter-
mining whether state law or federal procedure controls in such cases now proceeds under an
analysis laid out in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536-39 (1958).
Law enacted by Congress itself represents a second source of federal procedure. The use
of these statutes, usually encoded in title 28 of the United States Code, is now affected in
diversity cases by Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26-27 (1988). Rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court pursuant to a delegation of authority from Congress in the Rules En-
abling Act represent yet a third source of federal procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). The
applicability of Eie to such rules is, theoretically, controlled by the analysis the Court laid out
in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,464-65 (1965). This analysis was at issue in Walker. Walker
v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740, 741 (1980).
71. Walker, 446 U.S. at 742.
72. Id. at 743.
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
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court within the statute of limitations. 74
A unanimous Court held that state law controlled.75 Under the
Erie doctrine, as it applied to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 3 could control only if its authors sought to toll state statutes
of limitations.7 6 The Court, however, held that "in diversity actions
Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing requirements of
the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes of
limitations." 77 The decision seems straightforward enough, at least
if the reader is unaware of its background.
On its facts, Walker was very similar to Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co.,78 in which the Court reached the same decision as
in Walker.79 Between Ragan and Walker, however, the Court decided
Hanna v. Plumer,80 laying down an analysis for applying the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which was seemingly applicable to Walker.81
In Hanna, the Court established that a federal rule was lawful under
the Rules Enabling Act8 2 and therefore prevailed in a case involving
conflicting state law.8 3 To most observers, this seemed to be the
end of Ragan.8 4 Thus it was more than a small surprise when the
Court, in Walker, resurrected Ragan with the glib observation that a
74. Walker, 446 U.S. at 743.
75. Id at 752.
76. Id. at 751-52.
77. Id at 751 (citing 4 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1057 (1969)).
78. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
79. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 748 (applying state law over federal rule governing com-
mencement of civil action); Ragan, 337 U.S. at 532-33 (holding state statute applicable instead
of federal law in question involving tolling of statute of limitations in civil action). In Ragan,
the petitioner brought suit in federal district court on diversity grounds to recover damages
for injuries which occurred within two years of the filing of the complaint. Id A summons
was issued in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but was not served before
the statute of limitations expired. The Court held that the suit was barred by the state statute
of limitations, applicable under Erie. Id at 533.
80. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
81. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
83. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-72. The discussion of Hanna provides an opportunity to
discuss an issue that a proposal to reconsider Erie may raise. The issue concerns how, in a
post-Erie era, cases addressing the applicability of federal rules of procedure will be decided.
The answer is straightforward. If it is true that federal courts hearing diversity cases can and
should create something like federal general common law, it seems to me to follow that Con-
gress and the Supreme Court are acting appropriately when they promulgate rules of proce-
dure governing civil litigation in federal courts. Rejection of Erie, therefore, should produce
little difference to the outcome if a case like Hanna were to arise again. The most significant
difference, in fact, would probably be that Hanna would reach the same result without endur-
ing the difficult analysis the Supreme Court had to make in the original decision. Walker
would not change either if the federal rule at issue truly was not relevant to the case.
84. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474-78 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that Ragan, if still ap-
plicable, would have rendered different result). There were commentators, however, who
predicted the Court would use Walker to harmonize Ragan and Hanna. See Ely, supra note 2, at
729-33 (considering differences between Ragan and Hanna).
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rule expressly intended to govern the commencement of an action
was irrelevant to determining when a statute of limitations was
tolled.8 5 In a remark apparently designed to make Walker more
palatable, Justice Marshall shrunk from saying whether Rule 3 gov-
erned the tolling of a statute of limitations in a case arising under
federal law.8 6
By so doing, the Court maintained Ragan, and with it the possibil-
ity that in circumstances involving federal rules other than Rule 3,
Erie would still enable state law to control important procedural is-
sues.8 7 The motive for doing so is implicit in Justice Marshall's ex-
planation that applicability of Rule 3 in Walker would create the
possibility of forum shopping in future cases as well as an "inequita-
ble administration" of the law.88 These cases indicate just how "cer-
tain" in application Erie has become. If the struggle to harmonize
Ragan (Rule 3 inapplicable) with Hanna (federal rules control if they
clash with state law) reaches an implausible conclusion, consider
what drives the problem-the search, forty years after Erie, for prin-
cipled, predictable distinctions that explain when federal procedure
will apply to diversity cases.
Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods 9 seemed to retreat from
Walker.90 The company lost a personal injury suit at trial and ap-
pealed. 9' When the appeal proved unsuccessful, the plaintiff sought
an additional ten percent in damages which state law assessed
against unsuccessful appeals of money judgments. Rule 38 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allows additional damages
only if an appeal is determined to be frivolous. 92 This time, Justice
Marshall, writing again for a unanimous Court, relied on a Hanna
analysis. 93 He concluded that Rule 38 conflicted with the state law,
and that Hanna therefore mandated application of the federal rule.9 4
Justice Marshall cited Walker only once in Burlington, suggesting that
it was consistent with Hanna in finding that a federal rule applies if it
conflicts with state law. 95
85. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51 (describing intended effect of Rule 3).
86. Id. at751 n.1l.
87. Id at 753.
88. Id.; see infra notes 156-85 and accompanying text (examining equity of forum
shopping).
89. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
90. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4 (1987) (choosing to apply Hanna test
rather than Walker rationale).
91. Id. at 3.
92. FED. R. App. P. 38.
93. See Burlington, 480 U.S. at 4-6 (discussing Hanna's applicability).
94. Id. at 5-6.
95. Id. at 5.
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The facts of Burlington support the Court's conclusion that the
state and federal rules directly conflicted. Nonetheless, as a guide
for the future, Burlington is not entirely satisfying. As in Walker, the
language of the federal rule at issue seemed to suggest conflict with
the corresponding state law.9 6 Also as in Walker, there was at least
some evidence to support the proposition that the purpose behind
the federal rule conflicted with the purpose behind the state law.97
A final similarity between Walker and Burlington is that both fact
patterns contained some evidence that the federal and state rules at
issue might not be in conflict (thus justifying application of the state
rule).98 The major differences between the cases seem to be the
existence of Ragan's precedent as it affected Walker (but did not af-
fect Burlington) and the inclination of the Court in Burlington to reach
a different judgment.
As one who believes the outcome in Burlington to be correct, I
offer criticism of that case with some diffidence. It is difficult, how-
ever, to escape the suspicion that the primary cause of different out-
comes in Walker and Burlington had little to do with distinguishable
facts and more to do with the desire of the Court to breathe new life
into Hanna.99 Perhaps that is an improvement on Walker; but with
Walker unrepudiated, and not all that dissimilar on its facts from Bur-
lington, there is no certainty that another Walker will not reemerge in
the next Erie decision.
In fact, there is a faint specter of Walker's ghost in Stewart Organiza-
tion, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 100 A contract between the parties provided
that a suit arising out of the contract could be brought only in Man-
hattan. 0 1 Nevertheless, the plaintiff brought suit in federal district
court in Alabama. The defendant then moved to transfer the case to
96. See id- at 7 (finding that discretion allowed in Appellate Rule 38 contradicted
mandatory penalty affirmance provision in state statute).
97. See Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.10 (1980) (acknowledging and re-
jecting argument that Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules contemplated role for Rule 3 in
tolling statutes of limitations); Burlington, 480 U.S. at 7 (accepting analysis that both state rule
and Appellate Rule 38 addressed same issue in contradictory ways).
98. Compare Walker, 446 U.S. at 751 (finding purpose of Rule 3 not reaching issue gov-
erned by state law) with Burlington, 480 U.S. at 7-8 (finding that existence of additional state
rule regarding issue governed by Appellate Rule 38 suggests that Rule 38 and state rule at
issue do not conflict).
99. Note, however, that Walker discouraged a dawdling plaintiff from choosing the fed-
eral court to evade a problem of serving notice on the defendant before the statute of limita-
tions ran. In Burlington, by contrast, there was little likelihood that either party would choose
the federal court in advance of trial to avoid the ten percent increment levied on unsuccessful
appeals.
100. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
101. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 24 (1988).
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New York, pursuant to the federal change of venue statute.10 2
At that point, conflict between state law and federal procedure
emerged. Under state law, contractual forum selection clauses were
viewed unfavorably.' 03 By contrast, the federal transfer statute per-
mitted a federal court to weigh the forum selection clause in deter-
mining whether to grant the motion to transfer. 0 4 An 8-to-i
majority of the Supreme Court held that the federal transfer statute
controlled. 105
Writing for the Court again, Justice Marshall did not dwell on the
distinction between a federal rule, promulgated by the Court, and
federal legislation enacted by Congress. 0 6 Instead, he cited Burling-
ton for the standard developed in Hanna: if federal law and state law
are both on point, then federal law governs in a diversity case.'
0 7 Of
course the catch, once again, was in determining whether a valid
federal law conflicted with state law. This time, Justice Marshall
made a candid admission that section 1404(a) and the correspond-
ing state law addressing contract clauses on forum selection were
not "perfectly coextensive."'' 08
Marshall's acknowledgement, however, is mild compared to Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent. Justice Scalia first reasoned that the language
of section 1404(a) itself-that transfers were permitted "[flor the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of jus-
tice" 0 9-looked to current and future circumstances, not to any
prior contractual agreement among the parties. 10 To that extent,
he concluded, only state law was relevant as to how to treat a prior
contractual agreement choosing a forum."' Justice Scalia also
pointed out that most issues of contract law have long been recog-
nized to be governed by state law. 12 It therefore followed that, in
matters of contract not clearly in conflict with federal law or pre-
empted by federal statute, state law should govern." 3 His final ar-
gument was that a goal underlying Erie was to support uniform
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) (allowing transfer of civil action to another district
court for convenience of parties and witnesses).
103. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
104. Id. at 29-30.
105. Id at 23.
106. See supra note 70 (discussing origins of federal rules and legislative sources of federal
civil procedure).
107. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30. Note how this approach would give parties a strong incentive
to shop for federal statutory procedure in many circumstances.
108. Id.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
110. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 34 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
11. Id. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
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predictable outcomes between state and federal courts in deciding
claims, 14 which he found to be missing in Justice Marshall's major-
ity opinion.' 15
It may well be that the majority was right and Justice Scalia wrong
in Stewart. More important, though, is the implication that Stewart,
Burlington, and Walker have for the utility of the Hanna analysis for
federal procedural rules and statutes. Although two of those cases
were decided unanimously1 16 and the third had only a single dis-
sent,117 together the three decisions leave a well of uncertainty
about the applicability of federal procedural rules and statutes in
future diversity cases. 18 After those three decisions, can anyone say
with confidence when a federal rule collides sufficiently with a state
law so as to justify displacing the state authority? Charles Warren
and Justice Brandeis could not have known the magnitude of the
uncertainty Erie would sow.' 19
D. Did Swift Create Inequitable Opportunities for Forum Shopping?
Justice Brandeis' fourth criticism of Swift had two parts. Because
Swift created at least the possibility that federal courts would apply
common law different than the law available in state courts, parties
who stood to benefit by the application of federal law had an incen-
tive to invoke diversity jurisdiction. 120 If such a party did not al-
ready satisfy the requirements for diversity, it might do so by
114. Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. See id at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that interpretation of section 1404(a)
by majority was broad and ambiguous and would encourage forum shopping due to differ-
ences between federal and state law).
116. Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 2 (1987); Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S.
740, 741 (1980).
117. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. See Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 937, 940 (1988) (criticizing failure of Court to provide adequate explanation of under-
lying rationale in its decisions). The authors characterize the Court's application of the tests
derived from Erie as "ad hoc jurisprudence" and state that the Court appears to apply which-
ever test produces the "desired result." Id
119. Notwithstanding Erie, there remain areas in which federal courts are free to create
federal common law. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943)
(finding that federal common law, not state law, controls obligations of United States on its
own commercial paper). Because it is often difficult to determine when federal courts may
create such common law, and when they must instead defer to state law, this may seem at first
glance to be additional evidence of the uncertainty of the Erie doctrine in application. SeeJACK
H. FRIEDENTHAL Er AL., CIVL PROCEDURE 232 (1985) (stating that decision to create and apply
federal common law is result of highly fact specific analysis). Nevertheless, because such fed-
eral common law, where created, displaces all conflicting state law-something neither Swift
nor Erie authorizes-it is clear that the existence of federal common law unrelated to Erie is
not evidence of Erie's uncertainty. For a further discussion of this sort of federal common law,
sde infra note 209 (discussing federal common law developed to protect federal interests).
120. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
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altering its state citizenship.' 21 This advantage seemed particularly
unfair to Justice Brandeis because he believed that the option was
available only to some litigants.' 22 Thus the Court frowned on fo-
rum shopping in the first instance, and rejected its apprehended in-
equity in the second.'
23
This criticism of Swift had antecedents in the nineteenth cen-
tury.124 It was raised with renewed energy after the Court decided
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co. 125
1. The misunderstood taxicab company
Black & White arose out of a contract in which a railroad had
awarded a taxicab company exclusive rights to solicit taxi fares at a
railroad station in Kentucky. 126 The chief defendant was a compet-
ing taxicab company that was allegedly interfering with the exclusive
franchise. Both the railroad and the defendant taxi company were
incorporated in Kentucky. The plaintiff initially incorporated in
Kentucky, but prior to entering into the contract with the railroad, it
dissolved in Kentucky and reincorporated in Tennessee. 127 Once
established as a Tennessee corporation, the plaintiff made the con-
tract with the railroad.
28
Reincorporating in Tennessee meant that the plaintiff was now
diverse from the other taxicab company, and thus could sue to pre-
vent interference with the exclusive franchise in a federal court.
129
In fact, the acknowledged reason for reincorporating in Tennessee
was to create diversity for purposes of this case.' 30
Under Kentucky common law the contract at issue was invalid be-
cause it was anticompetitive. 13 No provision of the state constitu-
tion or state statute, however, prohibited the practice. Under
federal general common law, the contract was enforceable. 32 The
121. Id at 76. Justice Brandeis also noted that corporations could invoke diversity with-
out even changing residence simply by reincorporating in another state. Id. at 76-77.
122. See id at 74-75 (criticizing that only nonresidents of state would be able to invoke
diversity in this fashion).
123. Id.
124. See FREYER, supra note 11, at 85-86 (noting that Swift had been criticized in 1880s for
encouraging unfair forum shopping).
125. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
126. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 522 (1928).
127. Id. at 523-24.
128. Id. at 524.
129. Id. at 523.
130. Id. at 523-24.
131. Id at 526.
132. Id. at 526-27.
[Vol. 41:1087
VITALITY OF ERIE
motive for creating diversity and suing in a federal district court in
Kentucky seemed obvious: to obtain the application of the pro-
plaintiff federal law.
Following Swift, the Supreme Court upheld the lower decision to
apply federal law.13 3 Justice Holmes' famous dissent argued that
Swift "has resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of powers by
the Courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respecta-
ble array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct." 13 4 Justice
Brandeis, who would write the Erie opinion ten years later, was one
of two Justices who joined the Holmes dissent.
1 35
The Black & White decision resulted in enormous criticism and ap-
parently caused Congress to contemplate overturning diversity ju-
risdiction itself. 13 6 The ability of the plaintiff corporation to change
the applicable law simply by reincorporating in another state was
particularly troubling.1 37 This inequity was an important factor in
Justice Brandeis' justification for Erie.'38 Black & White's critics,
however, misunderstood two points: first, how easily the problem,
if it indeed was one, could be rectified; and second, whether the
matter was really an important inequity at all.
In the first place, the Court in Black & White made it clear that
changes of citizenship had to be genuine. A sham reincorporation
or a fraudulent change of domicile by a natural person is insufficient
to invoke diversity.'3 9 Moreover, attempts to invoke diversity
through maneuvers involving less drastic steps than change of citi-
zenship have long been subject to careful scrutiny, frequently result-
ing in disallowance of the attempted diversity jurisdiction.1
40
Assuming, as was the case in Black & White, that the change of
133. Id. at 530-31.
134. Id. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes made two additional arguments:
first, thatJustice Story had misconstrued the Rules of Decision Act as only referring to statu-
tory law; and second, that even under Swift the district court should have deferred to state law
because the question at issue involved the use of realty. Id- at 535-36 (Holmes,J., dissenting).
Some commentators believe Holmes most sharply disagreed with the majority over the realty
issue. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 119, at 193 n.20. Holmes himself, however, de-
scribed that as a "subordinate and narrower" ground for his dissent. Black & White, 276 U.S.
at 535 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
135. Black & White, 276 U.S. at 536 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justices Brandeis and Stone
joined in the dissent. Id.
136. See FREYER, supra note 11, at 105 (describing ChiefJustice Taft's use of influence to
block proposed legislation).
137. Id. at 109.
138. Erie, 304 U.S. at 76-77 ("And, without even change of residence, a corporate citizen
of the state could avail itself of the federal rule by reincorporating under the laws of another
state, as was done in the Taxicab Case.").
139. Black & White, 276 U.S. at 524.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1988) (containing current prohibition on attempts to invoke
diversity through improper or collusive assignments of causes of action and stating that fed-
eral jurisdiction will be denied in such cases); Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823,
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citizenship is genuine, though motivated solely by a desire to create
diversity jurisdiction, the problem is not likely to arise all that fre-
quently. Changing a corporation's place of incorporation is not a
decision that corporate leadership will undertake lightly. 141 The de-
cision can have consequences including additional incorporation
fees, tax liability, and susceptibility to lawsuit.' 42 With such factors
in mind, many enterprises are unlikely to conclude that the benefits
of diversity jurisdiction in a single case clearly outweigh the costs of
incorporation-even if the benefits of reincorporation include appli-
cation of the Swift doctrine.
Smaller corporations with perhaps less to lose in terms of public
image might be more willing to make such changes, but there is an-
other constraint that will often make them move slowly. Even if the
stakes in a particular case justify a decision to seek diversity, these
corporations will often nonetheless reject reincorporation in an-
other state because that action alone may be insufficient to create
diversity. Under the diversity statute as it now exists, corporations
are citizens of both the state in which they are incorporated and the
state that is their principal place of business. ' 43 The principal place
of business of a corporation is typically defined as either the location
of its corporate headquarters 144 or the place in which its major as-
sets can be found. 45 For smaller corporations, the state of principal
place of business is often likely to be identical with the original state
of incorporation.
Thus, changing the state of incorporation will not always create
diversity. A smaller corporation will usually continue to be a citizen
of the original state of incorporation, because that is the location of
its principal place of business. If Black & White worked an inequity
in 1928 by inviting corporations to forum shop by creating diversity
through reincorporation, the remedy was readily available. By en-
acting the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) in 1928 instead
of 1958, Congress would have frustrated the attempts of smaller
827-28 (1969) (finding assignment of interest lawful under state law, but nevertheless re-
jecting assignment as improper attempt to invoke diversity jurisdiction).
14 1. See LARRY D. SODERQUIST & A.A. SOMMERJR., CORPORATIONS: A PROBLEM APPROACH
49 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing factors considered in deciding location of incorporation).
142. lId
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1988). The provision making corporations citizens of the
states where their principal place of business is found was added in 1958. Act of July 25,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2(c), 72 Stat. 415, 415.
144. See Egan v. American Airlines, Inc., 324 F.2d 565, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding
place from which management and business policies emanate to be principal place of business
in facts of particular case).
145. See Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960) (citing pro-




corporations-the ones most likely to seek diversity through
reincorporation-to play the reincorporation/invocation-of-diver-
sity game.
Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect one Congress to recognize a
solution implemented thirty years later. But surely it is not unrea-
sonable to require critics of Black & White in 1928 to realize that,
under then existing choice-of-law rules, the tactic employed by the
plaintiff was not the only way, or even the easiest way, that the plain-
tiff could have achieved its end. As the majority in Black & White
established at some length, Kentucky was in a minority among the
states in holding exclusive franchise agreements invalid.146 That
fact, combined with choice-of-law analysis as it existed in the states
in the 1920s, should have provided the plaintiff with an easy method
of achieving enforcement of an exclusive franchise agreement.
In the 1920s, it was universally accepted among the states that the
law controlling the validity of a contract was the law of the state in
which the contract was made. 147 Thus, without reincorporating, the
Black & White plaintiff and the railroad theoretically could have
evaded Kentucky's refusal to enforce an exclusive franchise contract
simply by going to a more hospitable state to make the contract.
Then, when the plaintiff sought to enforce the contract against the
other taxicab company, it could have done so in a Kentucky state
court bound, under its own choice-of-law rules, to apply the law of
the state in which the contract was made. That was the theory. 148
Why, then, did the plaintiff in Black & White go to the trouble of
reincorporating as a means of obtaining the benefit of Swift, when
the goal of enforcing the contract could have been accomplished
more easily by maneuvering through choice-of-law rules? No cer-
tain answer is available, but a reasonable guess can be made. One
might assume that the plaintiff did not take the easy route because
the plaintiff feared that Kentucky state courts, historically hostile to
the kind of contract at issue, might not have been faithful to their
own choice-of-law rules. 149 A Kentucky court could have employed
146. See Black & White, 276 U.S. at 527-28 (citing two Supreme Court cases and decisions
in fifteen states finding exclusive franchise contracts valid).
147. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934). This approach was
"the universal American approach to choice of law" in the years before the First Restatement
was published. LEA BRILMAYER &JAMES A. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS
1 (3d ed. 1990).
148. See Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 118, at 953 n.52 (stating that Erie would not have
altered outcome in Black & White because of prevailing choice-of-law rules during period ap-
plicable to contract disputes).
149. See, e.g., Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 (1912) (citing rule that court must
apply law of state where cause of action arises unless contrary to public policy of forum);
Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1908) (stating that public
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"public policy" to frustrate the application of another state's law.150
This technique authorizes a court, faced with the application of a
sister state's law that it disfavors, to refuse to apply the other state's
law on the ground that it is contrary to the public policy of the
forum.
1 5 1
In theory, the public policy doctrine should have been used most
sparingly-otherwise it could have subverted the entire approach to
choice of law as it existed in the 1920s.152 In practice, however, any
plaintiff suing on a foreign cause of action runs at least some risk
that public policy will be invoked to defeat application of the foreign
law. There is no way to be certain.
15 3
Accordingly, it is entirely possible that the Black & White plaintiff
reincorporated in Tennessee to ensure that a Kentucky court had no
chance to make unprincipled use of public policy to frustrate en-
forcement of a contract lawful in Tennessee. If that is so, it makes
the plaintiff's forum shopping look much less cynical than the critics
of Black & White believed. In fact, if this scenario or one like it is
correct, it means that the only way the plaintiff could have been sure
of enforcing in Kentucky a contract lawfully made in Tennessee
would have been to reincorporate, sue in diversity, and obtain the
benefit of Swift.
This discussion should shed more favorable light on the possibili-
ties for forum shopping that Swift afforded. In fact, employing Swift
may have been the only way a plaintiff could be sure to enforce a
contract that was valid in the state in which it was made.
policy exception constitutes "settled law"); Stewart v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 168 U.S. 445, 448-
49 (1897) (stating that court will not enforce cause of action in tort if cause of action offends
public policy of forum).
150. See Cloud v. Hug, 281 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1955) (refusing to enforce penalty provision
of promissory note executed in Indiana because contrary to public policy of Kentucky).
15 1. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFICT OF LAWS § 620 (1934). For a somewhat more
extensive discussion of the public policy exception, see EUGENE F. ScoLEs & PETER HAY, CON-
FLICT OF LAws 72-75 (1982).
152. Cf Craig M. Gertz, Comment, The Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in International
Commercial Arbitration: A Case for Contractual Depecage, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 163, 185-86
(1991) (analyzing how court intervention through use of public policy doctrine destroys value
of choice of law clauses in arbitration agreements). Because the public policy doctrine has the
power to upset the expectations of contracting parties, the policy must be strong and well
defined to justify its invocation. Id. at 185.
153. See Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 239 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1968) (refusing to apply law of
Wisconsin in personal injury case arising out of that state). Wisconsin permitted a direct
action against the defendants' insurance company, but the Illinois court held that such a cause
of action violated the public policy of Illinois. Id at 802. But see Holzer v. Deutsche Reich-
sbahn-Gesellschaft, 14 N.E.2d 798, 799-800 (N.Y. 1938) (concerning breach-of-contract ac-
tion where defendant raised law of Nazi Germany, under which plaintiff's employment had to
be terminated because he was Jewish). The plaintiff sought to strike this defense as contrary
to the public policy of New York, but the court denied the motion. Id at 800.
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2. Is forum shopping inequitable?
The term "forum shopping" connotes something at least vaguely
disreputable. 154 Courts, however, condone the careful selection of a
forum in many circumstances. For example, if a defendant is faced
with an outraged public in a notorious criminal case and cannot de-
pend on getting an impartial jury, most courts and citizens would
consider it a matter of basic fairness at least to consider transferring
the case to a venue in which public sentiment is less inflamed. 15 5 A
defense attorney who failed to consider such an option would be
remiss.
The question, then, is not whether forum shopping is inherently
bad-clearly it is not. Instead, the question is why it was so bad in
Swift that Erie had to be invoked to strike it down. That question
rests upon another: If the forum shopping, encouraged by Swift and
exemplified by Black & White, is sufficiently harmful to justify striking
the entire Swift doctrine, why does the Supreme Court continue to
tolerate and even encourage similar forms of forum shopping that
have analogous consequences for the federal system?
Consider, for example, the impact of in personam jurisdiction on
forum shopping. Today it is clear that International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington 156 substantially enlarged the in personam jurisdiction of state
courts.' 5 7 Therefore, plaintiffs often have choices among fora that
might not have been available prior to International Shoe.' 58 For re-
sourceful attorneys, many considerations will weigh in deciding how
to choose among the expanded options, including docket loads, jury
demographics, ease of travel for attorneys, clients, and witnesses,
and the determination of which court is most likely to apply the law
favorable to their side of the case. In other words, there will be
many cases where the choice of which law to apply to the issues may
154. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV.
553, 553 (1989) (stating that "forum shopping" is disparaging term used to reproach litigant
who unfairly exploits rules to affect outcome of lawsuit). But see Note, Forum Shopping Reconsid-
ered, 103 HI-Rv. L. REV. 1677, 1689-95 (1990) (finding forum shopping serves legal system's
goals of ethical representation of clients, judicial efficiency, local autonomy over law, and rem-
edying injury).
155. See Scott Kafker, Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right to an ImpartialJury: Resolv-
ing the Conflict in the Federal Constitution, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 729, 731-34 (1985) (discussing right
of criminal defendant to move for change of venue in order to protect Sixth Amendment right
to impartial jury).
156. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
157. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 119, at 130 (explaining that International Shoe juris-
dictional standard based on "minimum contacts, fair play, and substantial justice" means that
single act or contact can justify court's exercise of jurisdiction over defendant).
158. See Susan Clark Taylor, Note, Rule 41(a)(2) Dismissals: Forum Shopping for a Statute of
Limitations, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 629, 636 (1990) (stating that broad personal jurisdiction
test established in International Shoe increased forum choices for plaintiffs).
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determine who wins.' 59 By increasing the plaintiff's opportunities
for in personam jurisdiction, International Shoe and related cases in-
creased the plaintiff's opportunities to shop among fora to obtain
the best possible choice of law.
160
If that sounds a lot like the impact of Swift in cases like Black &
White, it is because the similarity is great. Swift allowed plaintiffs eli-
gible to sue in diversity to choose between a state court, with its
common law, or a federal court, with federal general common law,
and thereby to obtain the law more favorable to the plaintiff.161 By
expanding the reach of in personam jurisdiction, International Shoe
and its progeny afforded plaintiffs a broader selection of state courts
from which to choose. In fact, in some cases the choice might be
even greater than that which was available under Swift.
One difference between Swift and International Shoe, of course, is
that Swift has been overturned.' 6 2 But even in that difference, other
similarities emerge. Swift was overturned and Erie was imposed, at
least in part, to vindicate the needs of a federal system.' 63 Interna-
tional Shoe overturned its precedent in order to-you guessed it-
vindicate the needs of a federal system "suited to a progressively
more mobile society."'"
Obviously there is more to it than that. In the first place, Interna-
tional Shoe is a jurisdictional decision. It identified the courts in
which a plaintiff may sue, with only secondary ramifications for
choice of law. Swift and Erie, in contrast, are explicitly choice-of-law
decisions. Thus while International Shoe demonstrates that our views
of forum shopping are heavily dependent on the circumstances in
which the shopping takes place, the Supreme Court merely acqui-
esced in allowing forum shopping to obtain the salutary result of
expanded in personam jurisdiction.16 5  But what if the Supreme
159. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 773-75 (1984) (allowing plaintiff
to bring diversity libel suit in New Hampshire even though statute of limitations had run in all
other jurisdictions); Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir.
1991) (stating that threshold question of choice of law regarding availability of preliminary
injunction as remedy could determine outcome in case where that remedy is sought); World-
source Coil Coating, Inc. v. McGraw Constr. Co., 946 F.2d 473, 481 (6th Cir. 1991) (Gadola,
J., dissenting) (noting that choice of law is potentially determinative in issue of waiver of right
to arbitrate).
160. Juenger, supra note 154, at 557.
161. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (concerning ease with which plaintiffs
could use Swift to shop for favorable law between state and federal courts).
162. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
163. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-80 (finding that Swifl doctrine infringed on rights reserved for
states).
164. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 119, at 123.
165. It is unlikely that the Court missed the implications of International Shoe for forum
shopping when it decided the case. Certainly the Court noticed the implications in cases that
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Court took things several steps further by encouraging forum shop-
ping so that Erie-the suppressor of forum shopping-could be
maintained? That may sound contradictory, but it is exactly what
the Court has recently done.
Ferens v. John Deere Co. 166 and an earlier decision, Van Dusen v. Bar-
rack,167 address choice-of-law questions arising out of a federal
change of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Section 1404 provides
that a district court may change the venue of a case when doing so
serves the convenience of parties and witnesses as well as the inter-
est ofjustice. 168 The Court in Van Dusen held that when a defendant
obtains a transfer of a diversity case pursuant to section 1404, the
state law to be applied in the federal court to which the case is trans-
ferred is the same law that the transferring court would have ap-
plied.' 69 The Court reasoned that, if the defendant can change the
applicable state law simply by obtaining a transfer, section 1404 is a
"forum-shopping instrument" rather than the simple housekeeping
measure Congress intended.1 70
Ferens involved the application of Van Dusen to a plaintiff's use of
section 1404 to transfer a case.' 7' Ferens was injured using farm
equipment that the defendant had manufactured. He was from
Pennsylvania and the accident occurred in Pennsylvania. The plain-
tiff brought contract and warranty claims in a federal district court in
Pennsylvania. Because Pennsylvania's statute of limitations on tort
expired before the suit was filed, however, he brought a tort action
in a federal district court in Mississippi.' 72 Under Mississippi law,
the tort claims were timely.'
73
The plaintiff then moved to transfer the Mississippi case to Penn-
sylvania, where it could be consolidated with the pending contract
claims. The defendant did not object to the transfer. When the
followed. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481-82 (1985) (analyzing
contractual choice-of-law provision relevant to jurisdictional issue); Keeton v. Hustler Maga-
zine, 465 U.S. 770, 773-76 (1984) (applying jurisdictional test in isolation of choice-of-law
issue); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (finding choice of law is irrelevant to
jurisdictional issue). Moreover, because the Court continues to adopt a broad view of in per-
sonam jurisdiction in at least some circumstances, it is clear that, even with the benefit of
hindsight, the Court is not terribly concerned with the forum-shopping implications of what it
has wrought. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (holding that service
on defendant present within state, irrespective of absence of other contacts with that state,
ipso facto establishes good in personam jurisdiction).
166. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
167. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
169. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
170. Id. at 635-37.
171. Ferens v.John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990).
172. Id. at 519-20.
173. Id. at 520.
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plaintiff sought to have the Pennsylvania court apply the Mississippi
statute of limitations to the tort claims, however, the defendant ob-
jected. 174 Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Kennedy held
that a federal court to which an action was transferred must "apply
the law of the transferor court, regardless of who initiates the
transfer."
75
Of particular interest is Kennedy's determination that Van Dusen
and Ferens are consistent with Erie. Kennedy noted that, under Erie,
the same law applies following venue transfers initiated by defend-
ant or plaintiff, and, therefore, plaintiff's choice of law is preserved
without disadvantaging the defendant. 76 Justice Kennedy did ac-
knowledge that the defendant in Ferens would lose the advantage of
not having to litigate the tort action in Pennsylvania, "or, put an-
other way, in forcing the Ferenses to litigate in Mississippi or not at
all."' 177 The Court, however, minimized the importance of this ad-
vantage to a defendant. It stated that the maneuver in Ferens only
deprived Deere of an opportunity to force the plaintiffs to litigate in
an inconvenient forum.1
78
In doing so, Justice Kennedy miscast the tactical situation of the
defendant. When both the transfer to Pennsylvania and the use of
Mississippi limitations were allowed in Ferens, the defendant got the
worst of both worlds-the law of Mississippi and a trial in Penn-
sylvania. 179 The latter is not only more convenient for the plaintiff,
but also probably assures the home-state plaintiff a more sympa-
thetic jury than the more distant, more conservative state of Missis-
sippi. This consideration might be central to any competent
attorney's preparation of the defendant's case and, therefore, could
represent far more than the minimal loss for the defendant that Jus-
tice Kennedy described.
174. Id. at 520-21.
175. Id. at 523.
176. Id. at 524-25. InJustice Kennedy's words:
The Erie policy had a clear implication for Van Dusen. The existence of diversity
jurisdiction gave the defendants the opportunity to make a motion to transfer venue
under § 1404(a), and if the applicable law were to change after transfer, the plain-
tiff's venue privilege and resulting state law advantages could be defeated at the defend-
ant's option....
Transfers initiated by a plaintiff involve some different considerations, but lead to
the same result.... A defendant, in one sense... will lose no legal advantage if the
transferor law controls after a transfer initiated by the plaintiff; the same law, after
all, would have applied if the plaintiff had not made the motion....
Id. (emphasis added). Emphasis was added to highlight the euphemismJustice Kennedy used
to describe forum shopping to obtain more favorable state law. See infra note 185 (analyzing
Justice Kennedy's use of term "forum shopping").
177. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 525.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 536-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 41:1087
VITALITY OF ERIE
Ferens rests on additional grounds not relevant here' 8 0 and there
is no need to belabor the issue of whether the case was correctly
decided. More relevant to the instant discussion is the manner in
which Justice Kennedy explained the Erie implications of Ferens. He
stated them concisely: "Applying the transferee [Pennsylvania] law
... would undermine the Erie rule in a serious way. It would mean
that initiating a transfer under § 1404(a) changes the state law appli-
cable to a diversity case."''
In other words, the Court accepted the maneuver of a Penn-
sylvania plaintiff, injured in Pennsylvania, who filed suit in Missis-
sippi to shop for the benefit of Mississippi law. Because the
defendant was diverse from the plaintiff, the plaintiff was able to file
the suit in a Mississippi federal court which, under Erie, would prob-
ably have applied Mississippi law.' 8 2 Because the suit was filed in
federal court, it could then be transferred to a federal court in the
more appropriate forum, Pennsylvania. As a result, the case ended
up in the state in which, considering the convenience of witnesses
and parties, it presumably should have been filed in the first place.
But there is an important difference between getting the case to
federal court in Pennsylvania through this maneuvering and getting
it there simply by filing suit in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff who initi-
ates suit in a Mississippi federal court to obtain more favorable Mis-
sissippi law-a result obtainable only because Erie directs the federal
court to use the same law that a Mississippi state court would use-
and then transfers to Pennsylvania, is rewarded for ingenuity in fo-
rum shopping. Mississippi law will control this case. By contrast,
the more mundane plaintiff, who simply files a Pennsylvania case in
a Pennsylvania federal court, will likely have to litigate under less
favorable Pennsylvania law.
Erie, the doctrine established to deter forum shopping between
federal court and state court based on differences in approach to
common law within one state, has evolved into the doctrine that, in
Ferens, actively encourages and rewards forum shopping among the
laws of the various states.183 If a plaintiff seeks to shop for Missis-
180. Id at 527-31 (concerning additional rationales in support of decision in Ferens, in-
cluding reducing opportunities for forum shopping, focusing on convenience considerations
rather than potential prejudice from change of law, and establishing clear rule in interest of
judicial economy).
181. Id. at 526.
182. Id
183. See, e.g., Sharon N. Freytag & Michelle E. McCoy, Conflict of Laws, 45 Sw. LJ. 149,
176-77 (1991) (stating rule in Ferens "seemed to reward [plaintiff] for his arguably manipula-
tive conduct" by giving him both choice of law and forum); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining
the Dismal Swamp: The Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. LJ. 1, 11 n.41 (1991) (criticizing result
which allows plaintiff to file suit in one state, obtain advantage of favorable choice of law, and
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sippi law without having to litigate in a Mississippi forum, Erie helps
make it possible. The Court justified this conclusion in Ferens by
explaining that a contrary result would "undermine" Erie by
"chang[ing] the state law applicable to a diversity case."' 18 4
Thus we learn that, in maintaining Erie, a doctrine justified in
large measure by the Court's opposition to forum shopping based
on differences in federal and state common law, the Court is willing
to tolerate-or even encourage-forum shopping based on differ-
ences between the law, judge-made or statutory, of states.' 8 5 Put
another way, the Court was willing to tolerate one type of forum
shopping in order to prevent another kind of forum shopping. Even
more than showing the Court's tolerance of forum shopping as a
price for improving its approach to in personam jurisdiction, 8 6 Fer-
ens and Van Dusen demonstrate the highly relative nature of the
Court's longstanding criticism of the forum shopping encouraged
by Swift.
Of course, the fact that different kinds of forum shopping are at
issue cannot be ignored. Under Swift, the standard of conduct by
which the parties would be judged was allowed to vary within a sin-
gle state, thereby encouraging forum shopping within a state. Eie
sought to discourage that kind of legal inconsistency within a state.
While International Shoe and Ferens encourage forum shopping
among states, they do not involve changes in the standard of con-
duct by which the parties are judged-at least in theory.'8 7 In prac-
tice, however, litigation involving choices of law among states also
creates substantial uncertainty as to what will be the standard of
conduct imposed on parties. To the extent that such uncertainty
occurs, the forum shopping encouraged by International Shoe and Fer-
then transfer to more convenient forum for that party); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva
Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66
N.Y.U.L. REv. 422,438 n.96 (1991) (citing Ferens as standing for proposition that plaintiff can
bring suit in "improper venue" to obtain favorable law and then move case to "desired
forum").
184. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 526.
185. Justice Kennedy shied away from recognizing that Erie, Van Dusen, and Ferens together
encourage state-law forum shopping. While he regularly used the term "forum shopping" to
describe Erie's purpose in discouraging choices between federal and state courts, he avoided
that term when describing the Erie/Ferens impact on a plaintiff's choice of forum as a means of
obtaining more favorable state law. Id. at 524-25. Instead, he simply described that sort of
forum-shopping opportunity as Erie's preservation of "state-law advantages." Id.
186. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing impact of International Shoe
in expanding in personam jurisdiction).
187. See Ferens, 494 U.S. at 527 (stating that plaintiffs had opportunity to choose between
two fora in which to obtain personal jurisdiction over defendant without regard for differ-
ences in laws of each state); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)
(permitting personal jurisdiction over corporation in those states where it conducts business
regardless of variation in state laws).
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ens is not significantly less malign than the forum shopping con-
demned by Erie.
Perhaps to some, the Erie doctrine is worth the price of this anom-
aly. In the aftermath of Ferens, however, it should be clear that if a
return to Swift can be justified on other grounds, 188 the price paid
for Swift in terms of increased potential for forum shopping between
federal and state common law might be more tolerable than Erie ad-
vocates have made it appear.
E. Swift's Constitutionality
Erie got a bad start in life when justice Brandeis rested his opinion
primarily on the thesis that Swift was unconstitutional.1 89 It has long
been easy to criticize this feature of Eie,190 but the entire problem
did not originate with justice Brandeis.
1. Tenth Amendment considerations
Without being entirely dear, the Supreme Court seemed to iden-
tify two possible grounds for holding Swift unconstitutional. The
first was the lack of federal authority to make law in areas reserved
for the states. 19' AsJustice Brandeis put it, Congress does not have
the "power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts."' 9 2 Presumably this was a reference to the Tenth Amend-
ment restriction on the powers of the Federal Government only to
188. See infra notes 245-81 and accompanying text (setting out support for revival of Swift
in light of Erie's shortcomings).
189. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78 ("If only a question of statutory construction were in-
volved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly
a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear, and
compels us to do so.").
190. See Keeffe et al., supra note 6, at 497 (questioning unconstitutionality of Swift and
stating that, given proper diversity jurisdiction, choice of using federal common law is reason-
able). The criticism is not limited to those who reject Erie. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note
119, at 196 (stating that finding of Swift's unconstitutionality by Justice Brandeis has sparked
extensive debate as to validity of his analysis and precise grounds upon which it rests). But see
HenryJ. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,
384 (1964) (stating that Erie reached correct result because overturning Swift brought uniform
federal law to those areas in which states had greater power than federal courts). Erie's consti-
tutional analysis also receives the sort of passive support that caused Professor Ely, see supra
note 2 and accompanying text, to characterize procedure scholars as strangely trusting. See
Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DuKE LJ. 281,
293 (agreeing with Justice Brandeis' finding that Constitution does not empower federal
courts to create and apply substantive law in all matters brought before them, regardless of
origin of cases).
191. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
192. Id.
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those delegated by the Constitution. 9 3 Because Justice Brandeis
believed the Constitution contained no express authority for the
Federal Government to make law in such areas as torts or contracts,
he concluded that there was no constitutional foundation for the
type of lawmaking undertaken by the Court in Swift.'
94
Even at the time of Erie, Justice Brandeis' view was challenged.
Rather than signing the majority opinion, Justice Reed only con-
curred in the holding because he could not agree that Swift was un-
constitutional. 95 The passage of time seems to have strengthened
Reed's position. As Professor Thomas Merrill observed, "Although
the framers may have intended that the federal government would
be a government of limited powers, in the years since Erie the
Supreme Court has permitted those powers to expand so much that
the federal government has authority to regulate in virtually any
area it chooses."' 1
96
This argument can be supported in any number of situations.
One of the most obvious demonstrations of increased federal power
lies in our greatly expanded view of the reach of federal lawmaking
authority under the Commerce Clause.'9 7 It is now established
Supreme Court precedent that congressional regulatory authority
under the Commerce Clause extends even to intrastate or local ac-
tivities which "might have a substantial and harmful effect upon...
commerce."' 98 Given the nature of the most common circumstance
in which Swift might have been applied-disputes involving citizens
of different states-it is clear how readily the contemporary inter-
pretation of congressional lawmaking authority under the Com-
merce Clause could reach such matters. Justice Brandeis may have
been correct when he wrote Erie, but the lawmaking authority of
Congress is much greater today.
Congressional authority and federal authority, however, are not
193. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
194. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
195. Id. at 90 (Reed, J., concurring) ("I concur in the conclusion reached in this case, in
the disapproval of the doctrine of Swift ... except in so far as it relies upon the unconstitution-
ality of the 'course pursued' by the federal courts.").
196. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 14-
15 (1985) (citing Henry Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism", LAw & CONTEMp.
PROBs. 39,42 (Summer 1980) and EEOC v.-Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244-51 (1983) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3. Alternatively, the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, authorizes Congress to make laws in support of its authority to create
lower federal courts. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (granting Congress power to create
courts inferior to Supreme Court).
198. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
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necessarily synonymous terms. Professor Merrill suggests that while
Congress' authority to make law has expanded, constraints remain
on the ability of federal courts to encroach on areas of state law. 199
As plausible as the distinction sounds, Merrill's examination of its
underlying principles indicates that the theory is less of a roadblock
to a return to federal common law than it might at first appear.
The three most plausible constitutional considerations supporting
a distinction between the withering of congressional constraints on
intrusion into state preserves and the continuing vigor of similar
constraints on the federal judiciary are (1) the absence of state rep-
resentation in the judicial branch, compared to the representation
states enjoy in Congress; (2) the separation of powers between the
lawmaking (congressional) branch and the law-applying (judicial)
branch; and (3) the absence of direct accountability of federal
judges to voters.200
The first constitutional issue operates as follows: Because states
are represented in Congress, they can be said to have acquiesced in
the congressional creation of federal law affecting their interests. 20 1
Conversely, an absence of state representation in the federal judici-
ary suggests no acquiescence in the creation of federal judge-made
law.20 2 To Merrill, this first constraint applied "only when federal
law interferes with actual state interests, '20 3 which means that fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity can create law in those procedural ar-
eas in which no important state interests are affected.
It would seem, however, that if this restriction applies only when
states cannot protect themselves through representation, it should
limit little of a federal judge's power under Swift. By its terms, Swift
applied only when a state legislature had not spoken, i.e., under
Swift, federal general common law could displace state common law,
but not state statutes. 20 4 Thus, if a state disapproved of a rule of
substantive law developed by federal courts hearing diversity cases,
199. Merrill, supra note 196, at 15. Professor Merrill explained:
[Tihe federalism principle identified by Erie still exists but has been silently trans-
formed from a general constraint on the powers of the federal government into an
attenuated constraint that applies principally to one branch of that government-the
federal judiciary.... With respect to judicial power ... the federalism principle still
has force.
Id; see also PaulJ. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1682,
1685-87 (1974) (discussing principle of federalism as institutional restraint on all branches of
Federal Government, explicitly including federal judiciary in light of need to protect rights of
states to make laws in areas of state competence).
200. Merrill, supra note 196, at 13-27.
201. I at 16-17.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 18.
204. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (stating that because Swift does not
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the state legislature could change the precedent simply by enacting
law that reflected the state's view. Accordingly, legislatures that re-
mained silent in the face of federal general common law created in
diversity cases could fairly be said to have accepted the result.20 5
The second constitutional consideration in the potentially dispa-
rate restraints placed on Congress and the federal judiciaryo-the
separation of powers doctrine-rests on the assumption that Con-
gress, not the federal courts, is supposed to make law. 20 6 Thus, fed-
eral courts without power to make law in federal areas should a
fortiori steer clear of lawmaking when the matter properly belongs
to the states. Professor Merrill, however, points out that even taking
a very restrictive view of the power of federal courts to "make" law,
their apparently clear power to "interpret" law is not seriously con-
tested. 20 7 At the least, this indicates that federal courts have the
power to make procedure. 208 At the most, it might mean that fed-
eral courts are no more disabled from "interpreting" state law, in
the absence of statute, than are state courts which are operating
under an analogous constraint. In fact, if "interpreting" state law is
intended to be a straitjacket on judicial lawmaking, it may cast a
shadow on substantive common law itself-a result that even many
observers partial to Erie may not wish to reach. 209
The third constitutional consideration offered for constraining
federal judicial incursions into areas of state law is the unac-
apply to local statutes or local usages, it does not affect cases arising out of local law, such as
disputes relating to real property).
205. But cf. Merrill, supra note 196, at 22 (reasoning that legislatures, with crowded agen-
das, are unlikely to have much opportunity to respond to judicial decisions with overriding
legislation). Although crowded agendas may prevent legislative override, that assertion does
little damage to the idea that in the end judges making common law can be overridden by
legislatures. Crowded agenda or not, it is precisely in areas of greatest state sensitivity that
legislatures are likely to make time to consider overriding a judicial decision intruding on
state interests.
206. Id at 19.
207. Id at 23.
208. Id at 21-24.
209. Notwithstanding Erie, federal common law exists in a variety of areas in which the
federal courts have found its existence necessary to the vindication of an important federal
interest. The classic example is Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, in which the Supreme Court
held that the obligations of the United States on commercial paper are governed by federal
common law, not state law. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
Scholars who are proponents of Erie nonetheless often approve of this type of federal com-
mon law on the ground that it is necessary to preserve certain federal interests not precisely
addressed by the Constitution or a federal statute. See DanielJ. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures
of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1131-33 (1986) (approving Erie, but justifying use of
federal common law in areas of federal interest).
Unlike Swift, Clearfeld and related cases do not defer to conflicting state law when the source
of state law is statutory. Also unlike Swift, federal common law of the type developed in
Clearfield must be applied in both federal and state courts. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 119,
at 230-31.
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countability of federal judges to an electorate. 210 This idea is simi-
lar to the argument that federal judges should not make state law
because they are not accountable to the states in the same way as
Congress. Moreover, because federal judges usually sit for life,
211
while many state judges are appointed, or even elected, for terms, it
is clear that federal judges theoretically are less accountable to an
electorate than their state counterparts.
This distinction, however, may have little practical consequence.
Unlike legislators, whose success in elections can turn on the candi-
dates' position on issues, judges are rarely turned out of office be-
cause they took a position on an issue of substantive law. The fact
that a few notorious instances come to mind where that actually oc-
curred demonstrates only how unusual, even bizarre, it was when
the event took place.2 12 In practice, state judges are substantially
insulated from the rigor of elective politics. 213 To that extent they
are not much more accountable to the voters than federal judges. If
one group is disabled from making state law on that ground, then
the other group must be nearly as unqualified.
Finally, there is still another answer to the argument that Con-
gress can now properly intrude in many matters formerly reserved
to the states, while federal courts cannot. Even if that distinction
has substantial vitality, much of the problem can be overcome sim-
ply by enacting legislation in which Congress delegates its power to
make substantive law to the courts. The precedent for Congress to
delegate its authority, subject only to quite minimal standards, is
now so well established that it seems an easy avenue around most of
the roadblocks discussed above.214 Because Congress remains re-
210. Merrill, supra note 196, at 24.
211. U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 1.
212. See Reynolds Holding, Killer of 2 Patrolmen Faces Death Again, Appeal Court in San Fran-
cisco Rules Out New Trial, S.F. CHRON., May 2, 1991, at A20 (stating that death sentence of
individual by court led to removal of three justices from California Supreme Court); Cheryl
Sullivan, U.S. Voters Tended to Base Choices on Less-than-Global Issues, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONrrOR,
Nov. 6, 1986, at 20 (commenting on California Supreme Court's liberal reputation and repu-
tation for overturning death sentences).
213. See Bradley C. Cannon,Judicial Election and Appointment at the State Level: Commentary on
State Selection ofJudges, 77 Ky. LJ. 747, 747-48 (1989) (arguing that, although law and politics
cannot be separated completely, state judges are usually not affiliated with particular parties
or groups); Julio A. Thompson, Note, A Board Does Not a Bench Make: Denying Qyasi-Judicial
Immunity to Parole Board Members in Section 1983 Damage Actions, 87 MICH. L. REv. 241, 254
(1988) (indicating that state judges are insulated from political pressure).
214. See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (stating
that Congress delegated power to develop governing principles of law regarding Sherman Act
to federal courts); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968) (stating
that unless Congress expresses clear intent to regulate actions of agencies, courts have dele-
gated power from Congress to ensure agencies achieve their goals); Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (stating substantive law to be applied in labor suits is federal
law which courts must fashion); see Merrill, supra note 196, at 40-46 (stating that delegated
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sponsive to both the states and the voters, the possibility of cur-
tailing such a delegation through the democratic process should go
far to answer the concern that federal courts should be sensitive to
those constituencies when making common law. 21 5 In short, the dis-
tinction between congressional power to enter the formerly forbid-
den realms of state law, and the perceived restrictions on the
discretion of federal courts to do the same under a Swift-like power,
should not be a substantial obstacle to federal common law in diver-
sity cases.
2. Equal protection considerations
Another attack Justice Brandeis made upon Swift may have been
grounded in the Equal Protection provision of the Fifth Amend-
ment.216 After observing that Swift's opportunities were available
only to plaintiffs who were not citizens of the same state as the de-
fendant, Justice Brandeis concluded that this "grave discrimination
by noncitizens against citizens ... rendered impossible equal pro-
tection of the law." 217 Under current equal protection analysis, this
attack cannot be sustained.
There is no doubt that Swift afforded plaintiffs who qualified for
diversity jurisdiction a potential advantage not enjoyed by plaintiffs
who could not qualify. In fact, it is in that difference that Swift cre-
ated the potential for forum shopping.218 Today, however, no one
contends that such distinctions, even if they constitute "discrimina-
tion," would therefore be invalid as violations of an equal protection
guarantee.
It is now long settled that courts will not strike down a law as
unconstitutional simply because it creates classifications of peo-
ple.219 Many laws have, as their bedrock purpose, the bestowal of
lawmaking may be express or implied and that implied delegated lawmaking gives rise to
question of whether delegation is sufficiently circumscribed and whether delegation is
intended).
215. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 805, 844-45 (1989)
(arguing that not only are federal courts influenced by congressional accountability, but also
that courts go further than Congress in protecting rights of political minorities).
216. U.S. CONST., amend. V. The Fifth Amendment does not contain an explicit guaran-
tee of equal protection, but it has been held to be implicit in the due process provision of the
Amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1955) (stating that concepts of equal
protection and due process stem from American idea of fairness and are not mutually
exclusive).
217. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
218. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (showing criticism dating back to
1880s of Swifi's creation of forum shopping through advantages gained by plaintiffs from us-
ing federal law as opposed to state law).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 65 (1989) (holding that assess-
ment of fee from successful American claimants for cost of upkeep of Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal is not unconstitutional); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 430 (1974)
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benefits upon some, and not upon others. They must in some de-
gree "discriminate" between those who will benefit and those who
will not. A law providing state funds to buy lunches for economi-
cally disadvantaged children, for example, "discriminates" against
children from wealthier families, but does not perforce violate equal
protection. If the Government is able to provide a rational basis for
the distinctions, the law may stand.220
If legislation affects groups by creating distinctions that the
Supreme Court denotes "suspect classes," of course, the result may
be entirely different. In such cases, the equal protection analysis re-
quires a court to undertake much closer scrutiny of the classifica-
tion, and to strike down the law if the Government is unable to
provide a sufficiently compelling justification for its classification. 221
The Supreme Court has not held, however, that distinctions be-
tween citizens of one state and citizens of another, as diversity juris-
diction differentiates them, constitute suspect classifications. The
relevant analysis to apply to Swift would therefore be the "rational
basis" standard, which could be readily met. As Justice Brandeis
himself noted in Erie, one purpose underlying the Swift decision was
a desire to promote uniformity in state law222-surely a rational goal
supported by federal general common law. That goal alone would
enable Swift to withstand an equal protection attack today.223
(holding that exclusion of addicts with two or more prior felony convictions from rehabilita-
tive commitment program does not violate due process or equal protection); Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (holding that statute prohibiting advertis-
ing on vehicles unless connected with business purpose of vehicle itself is constitutional).
220. Railway Express, 336 U.S. at 110-11 (stating that when traffic control and use of high-
ways are concerned, local authorities will be given great leeway to regulate even if regulation
interferes with interstate commerce).
221. See, e.g., Clark v.Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that classifications based on
illegitimacy of children are subject to "intermediate" scrutiny); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
230 (1982) (declaring statute that prohibited children of illegal aliens from receiving educa-
tion in state school system to be unconstitutional); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (hold-
ing statute establishing classifications based on gender are subject to "intermediate"
scrutiny).
222. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
223. Probably with a view to the equal protection analysis that has developed since Erie,
the Supreme Court no longer refers to the new doctrine's purpose as upholding the equal
protection requirements of the Constitution. Instead, at least since Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965), the goal has been restated as "avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws," a description that stops well short of constitutionalization of Erie. See id at 468 (finding
unsubstantial variations between courts unlikely to raise sort of equal protection problems
addressed in Erie). It should be noted, however, that this remark was made in the context of
the applicability of Erie to procedural matters. The constitutional infirmities Justice Brandeis
found in Swift, however, were not similarly applicable to the use of federal procedure. See Erie,
304 U.S. at 91-92 (asserting that Erie does not displace federal procedure) (Reed, J., concur-
ring). Accordingly, there was no necessity for the Court in Hanna, which was considering the
use of federal procedure in a diversity case, to discuss the constitutional foundations of Erie.
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-74 (holding that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not come
under Erie analysis due to absolute right of Congress to prescribe rules for federal courts).
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Therefore, it is Justice Reed's concurrence, not the majority in Erie,
that has stood the test of time on the constitutionality of Swift.
224
IV. OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ERIE
It would be surprising if, over fifty years of use, Erie advocates
were unable to develop other reasons for continued application of
the doctrine. While those that have surfaced tend to be modifica-
tions of the original justifications, rather than entirely new argu-
ments, they provide a gloss which allows Erie to appear in a
somewhat different light. For that reason, a discussion of the con-
tinued utility of Erie should take account of newer considerations
developed by the Supreme Court.
A. Hanna's Twin Aims
In cases that apply Erie to the use of federal procedure in diversity
cases, the Court now commonly refers to the "twin aims" of Erie.
2 25
These aims are described in Hanna v. Plumer as "discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws." 226 Both goals trace their roots to the original reasons for
overthrowing Swift. Discouraging forum shopping has been part of
the Erie doctrine since its inception. This concern has already been
the subject of substantial discussion,227 and will be weighed against
the costs that Erie imposes in other areas.
228
The second of the twin goals will also be discussed later in this
Article,2 29 but a few words should be said about this issue now.
Avoiding "inequitable administration of the laws" appears to be a
close cousin to Justice Brandeis' concern that Swift might have vio-
224. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 91 (arguing that even in absence of federal statutory direction,
federal courts would not necessarily be compelled to follow state decisions).
225. See, e.g., Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1222 (1991) (holding that
courts of appeals have duty to review district court's determination of state law which flows
from twin aims of Erie); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988) (assert-
ing that if no federal statute or rule governs point in dispute, district court must evaluate
whether application ofjudge-made federal law contradicts twin aims of Erie); id. at 40 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority opinion that fashioning judge-made rule is consis-
tent with twin aims of Erie); Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (stating that, in
absence of federal rule, state law should apply in order to comply with Erie's twin aims).
226. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
227. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text (discussing differences and similarities
between forum shopping discouraged by Erie and acceptable types of forum shopping which
have since been created).
228. See infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text (arguing that costs of Elie include
problems in understanding doctrine and limited scholarly time and resources available to in-
terpret doctrine).
229. See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text (arguing that state courts will never
wholly agree on all issues of common law, but when federal courts present better approach to
issues, state courts will likely move toward similar positions).
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lated equal protection guarantees. As Chief Justice Warren ex-
plained in Hanna, "[T]he Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization
that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation ma-
terially to differ because the suit had been brought in a federal
court. ' 230 The language is important. Writing as he did, ChiefJus-
tice Warren avoided a suggestion that the "unfairness" issue rose to
the level of a constitutional concern.231
The distinction between a policy based on fairness and a constitu-
tional mandate is important to the future of the Erie doctrine. If the
alternative to Erie is a violation of the Constitution, then Erie cannot
be shaken. Because the Court's concerns in Hanna were not consti-
tutional, however, that case does not preclude reconsideration of
the costs and benefits of Erie.23 2 Thus, under Hanna, if reasonable
people disagree with Chief Justice Warren's "fairness" assessment,
or if they believe that other considerations outweigh the disadvan-
tages of Swift's perceived unfairness, then they may advocate
changes in Erie without contemplating amendments to the
Constitution.
B. A New Swift in Conservative Hands
In preparing to write this Article, I was fortunate enough to men-
tion my ideas about overthrowing Erie's restraints on federal judges
to a colleague, Professor Robert Vaughn. Included among his sug-
gestions was a comment on the irony of advocating an increase in
the power of federal judges to create common law when so many of
them took office because they share a conservative view of judicial
power to make laws.
233
Once pointed out, the irony was not entirely lost on me. Lurking
within the irony might be an apprehension that conservative federal
judges could use their power under a restored Swift to undermine
230. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467.
231. See id (" 'Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citi-
zens.... Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.' ") (quoting
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75).
232. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72 (holding that Erie did not pronounce constitutional
argument against Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or role of federal courts).
233. The assertion that most federal district court judges are now, in this sense, judicial
conservatives is based on the assumption that most of them were nominated by either Presi-
dent Reagan or President Bush, and that they generally reflect views on the judiciary that
those presidents have advocated. Obviously the assumption can be no more than a general-
ization. Moreover, because there can be substantial differences among conservatives, it does
not follow that all, or even most, would adopt a unified position toward exploiting the new
discretion that a return to Swift would afford to federal judges. See generally Donald W. Fyr,
Judicial Selection: New Players, Same Game, 38 EMoRY LJ. 771, 771-72 (1989) (pointing out that
new conservative additions to courts are not as eager to play part of'"activist" as liberal judges
have in recent years).
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more liberal features of current state common law. Is that a reason
to retain Erie? I think not, for several reasons.
First, the goal of procedure should not be to favor one side or
another of either a political debate or a cause of action. Instead, the
goal should be to establish fair, efficient processes for prosecuting
the causes of action that society chooses to create. To the maximum
extent practicable, standards of fair play should reflect the shared
values that a democratic society develops.
Obviously this goal is one that will never be achieved completely.
Too many practical obstacles stand in the way, including friction be-
tween fairiess and efficiency, perceived shared values that turn out
not to be so widely shared after all, and the reality that some areas
of procedure, such as class actions, tread so closely to political, eco-
nomic, or social sensitivities that notions of neutrality in procedure
can be ephemeral. In fact, there are so many obstacles to perfectly
fair and efficient procedure that we can forget why we should strive
for it. We need to be reminded not only of what our direction is,
but why it should be our direction. Simple analogies can help us
here.
The impossibility of completely achieving a goal does not invali-
date the goal. Professional baseball players hit safely less than half
of the times they bat. Yet no one suggests that, because they are
likely to fail in any given effort to hit safely, they should stop trying.
In procedure the goal should be to produce fair processes that re-
flect consistency with our Constitution and the best achievable com-
promises between various conflicting interests. We will not always
succeed; but we are likely to succeed more often, or at least come
closer to success, if we continue to try.
In this context, that means trying to establish the best proce-
dure-even if it gives a temporary advantage to one group of par-
tisans in a continuing judicial debate. The advantage is likely to be
temporary; the political pendulum swings freely within the United
States, and the day will probably return when less conservative
judges predominate.
Second, the irony of empowering conservative judges to perform
an activist role in making common law contains within it the seeds of
another irony which may nullify the first. Conservative judges, if
drawn from the group that values judicial restraint, may well forego
much of the opportunity to remake state common law. If Eie is
abandoned, it might be a generation or more before the imprint of
federal general common law is felt on state law.
Finally, the ultimate irony is that in the Swift/Erie confrontation,
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the newer doctrine may embody conservative values more com-
pletely. Keep in mind that it was Charles Warren who explored the
outermost reaches of conservative states' rights judicial values 23 4
and whose work so influenced Justice Brandeis' opinion.2 35 The
more conservative wing of the current Supreme Court has been able
to employ Erie to limit the role of lower federal courts.
23 6
Perhaps the conservatives' use of Erie is not so surprising. Swift,
after all, tilted the balance of federal/state judicial relations toward
federal authority. Erie's redress of that tilt would, at most times in
American history, have been something conservatives would be in-
clined to favor.23 7 In the end, the lesson may be that altering proce-
dure to create winners and losers in left/right judicial debates can
be a very convoluted process, one in which the tactics obscure the
goals. Probably all sides would benefit by keeping a closer eye on
more bedrock notions of fair play-irrespective of the identity of the
immediate winner.
V. ABANDONING ERIE
A. The Benefits of Hindsight
The reasons Justice Brandeis offered for overthrowing Swift were
well thought out. Swift had not achieved complete harmony in state
common law.23 8 There was uncertainty about when to apply the
doctrine, as well as when to disregard it.239 Swift encouraged forum
shopping between federal and state courts based on potential differ-
ences between federal and state common law, and restricted the
234. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (demonstrating Warren's aversion to
allowing federal access to cases which could be tried in state courts).
235. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text (noting Warren's predisposition against
active role for federal courts).
236. See George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implications for the
Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IowA L. REv. 617, 617-18 (1984) ('Justices Powell and
Rehnquist, in particular, view Erie as powerful support for their view of the proper role of
federal courts in the context of what might be called nonconstitutional litigation. Not surpris-
ingly, given the views expressed by these two justices in other contexts, that role is viewed as a
highly limited one.").
237. See, e.g.,Jack M. Beermann, "Bad "Judicial Activism and Liberal Federal-Courts Doctrine: A
Comment on Professor Doernberg and Professor Redish, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1053, 1070 (1990)
(describing "sea of restraint" on federal judicial activism at hands of conservative judges);
Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
65 TUL. L. REv. 585, 657 (1991) (stating return to state authority is typical outcome when
conservative courts, especially Supreme Court, are sitting); R. George Wright, Two Models of
Constitutional Adjudication, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1357, 1370 (1991) (stating generally that conser-
vatism opposes judicial activism).
238. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (stating that Swift provided an addi-
tional body of law to consider along with state law choices).
239. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (showing thatJustice Brandeis' research
led him to list of approximately 1000 cases which involved unclear distinctions between ques-
tions of general and local law that left no discernable rule for court to follow).
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availability of such opportunities only to potentially diverse liti-
gants. 240 Furthermore, the 1930s view of federal power under the
Constitution was different from what we know today. 24 1 In other
words, the Court had many reasons to be concerned about Swift,
and to search for palatable alternatives. Only hindsight suggests
that the remedy of Erie may have been worse than the problem of
Swift. But hindsight is just another word for the process by which
we use life's experience to measure our successes and shortcomings.
It is only fair to see if Erie, in its middle age, lives up to the promise
of its youth.
B. Erie's Shortcomings
It appears that adopting Erie was a change we could have done
better without. The uncertainty of Swift was real, but Erie's record of
uncertainty is such that, had it been known in 1938 when Erie was
decided, the new rule would have been hard to justify on the ground
that it would afford greater predictability. 242 Moreover, today our
view of the Constitution is sufficiently different in that it is now a
struggle to justify the constitutional concerns that Justice Brandeis
called the bedrock reason for overruling Swift.
2 43
That Erie proved to be unwise, though, is not necessarily the same
as concluding that Erie should now be displaced. Before that con-
clusion is reached, two obstacles should be overcome. First, the
benefits of displacing Erie must at least be greater than the costs (in
retraining lawyers and judges, etc.) that an important change in law
inevitably requires.244 Second, and more important, there must be
an alternative body of law that is preferable to Erie. In practice,
many of the considerations addressing one obstacle may also apply
to the other.
240. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (pointing to possibility that some liti-
gants could manipulate system of procedure by altering state of citizenship, while others
could not).
241. See supra notes 189-98 and accompanying text (referring to difference between 1930s
notion that Congress had no power to create substantive rules of common law applicable to
states, and today's notion that Congress may reach individuals in state matters).
242. See supra notes 69-119 and accompanying text (distinguishing between possibility
that Erie's uncertainty might have been due to problem of working out new doctrine and
reality that Erie has produced substantial confusion in American law).
243. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (portraying Supreme Court's role
since Erie as one of allowing Federal Government to expand powers to regulate).
244. John B. Corr, Supreme Court Doctrine in the Trenches: The Case of Collateral Estoppel, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 83-84 (1985) (asserting that landmark changes in law impose greater
costs than evolutionary changes).
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C. Reasons for Change
1. The cost of Erie's uncertainty
Some years ago I examined the application of two Supreme Court
doctrines in the lower federal courts. 245 I was less interested in the
doctrines themselves than in the lessons that might be learned
about general considerations that should go into fashioning judicial
rules. One of the conclusions of that study was that, other things
being equal, legal rules of substantial complexity impose costs that
simpler statements of the law probably do not incur.246 Such costs
come not only in the degree of difficulty citizens have in understand-
ing rules to which they should conform their behavior, but even
among the judges who struggle to understand the law they are sup-
posed to apply.
247
At the time, it did not occur to me to use Erie as one of the doc-
trines to put under the microscope. Few doctrines, however,
demonstrate better than Erie how rules that are difficult to apply can
inflict costs so substantial that they undermine the value of the rules.
As I have already noted, Erie has been the subject of a continuing
Supreme Court effort, over two generations, to clarify the bounda-
ries between federal procedure and state law. That such a huge ef-
fort is necessary is evidence that Erie is difficult law. The time and
effort it takes the Supreme Court to work out and explain law must
count as a cost against a doctrine.
The cost is also felt at many levels below that of the Supreme
Court. Lawyers and lower court judges are no better equipped,
either intellectually or in the way of research resources, to work out
the doctrine. Those practitioners can only struggle in the swamp
while they wait for another Supreme Court pronouncement which
perhaps will bring some light to a doctrine that even the Court de-
scribed, thirty years after Erie, as "unguided." 248 The time ex-
pended in these efforts is also a cost, but it is not the only one felt at
this less exalted level of lawyers and trialjudges. When the decision
is wrong at this level-and the experience of the Supreme Court in
difficult cases suggests a fifty-fifty chance that the decision will in-
245. See id. at 84 (discussing Supreme Court's role in development of collateral estoppel
doctrine). For earlier research on the issue of developing effective judicial doctrine see John
B. Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C. L. REv. 745, 745-
48 (1983) (discussing practical problems of applying retroactivity doctrine).
246. See Corr, supra note 244, at 84-85 (arguing that Supreme Court's task is to provide
enough complexity to allow doctrine or rule to work while avoiding trap of making doctrine
or rule too intricate or incomprehensible).
247. See id. at 86-89 (calling for Supreme Court to allow lower courts more discretion in
implementing new rules and doctrines).
248. Hanna v. Plumer. 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
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deed be wrong at the lower level-the parties who would have won
their cases, but for the error, often pay a much greater cost than
mere loss of time.
Many scholars have described Erie as confused, 249 and two have
even characterized it as "the central concern of an entire generation
of academic lawyers." 250 The comment was meant as evidence of
the importance of Erie, but it is also evidence of its burden. Limited
scholarly time and resources are valuable, as is the time of justices,
judges, and practicing attorneys. All of that effort must be paid for
in one way or another, suggesting that the investment must bejusti-
fied by a return.
Erie's costs do not end even there. They also enter the classroom.
The evidence here is anecdotal, but telling. When law students re-
count their difficulties with the civil procedure course, Erie figures
prominently in their complaints. In that sense, their suspicions of
their professors' motives may be misplaced, but are not entirely
neurotic. When one considers how expensive law school can be,
and how much time may be devoted to Erie, it may be reasonable to
ask if this much time, effort, and money should be expended on a
doctrine whose difficulty in application remains beyond the grasp of
so many, even after they leave law school.
In addition to all the frustrations of learning and applying this
elusive doctrine where federal procedure meets state law, there is
more. Uncertainty and potentially bad decisions emanating from
the pronounced tendency of federal courts to guess at what state law
may be are also unacceptable costs. Perhaps these costs would be
more tolerable if Erie was a doctrine of profound social significance
or otherwise of fundamental value. The costs would be less irritat-
ing if, whatever the flaws of Erie, there was no alternative but to ac-
cept this approach. There is, however, an alternative. It is Swift, or
something like Swift.
2 5 1
249. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 5, at 1091-92 (arguing that federal courts have ignored
underlying reasons for Erie inquiry-federalism and protection of state's rights); Mary K.
Kane, The Gold Wedding Year: Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 671, 687 (1988) (stating that lower federal courts have knee-jerk reac-
tions to Erie questions, furthering crowding of Supreme Court docket); Louise Weinberg,
supra note 215, at 829 (stating that Erie doctrine became muddled instead of providing clarity
as intended).
250. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 5, at 312 (referring to Erie as most studied principle
in American law and keystone of civil procedure courses).
251. See Weinberg, supra note 215, at 851-52 (discussing possibility of return to common
law and calling for scholars to search for true issues in debate, rather than masked Erie issues).
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2. Comparing Swift's costs
a. The cost of change
Justice Brandeis pointed out how much time and effort was in-
vested in determining, under Swift, when to apply federal general
common law. 252 That was certainly a cost Swift imposed. In re-
turning to Swift, however, the existence of those 1000 digested fed-
eral cases cited by Justice Brandeis play a different role. In fact, they
actually help keep the costs of change down.
As has already been discussed, there is a transaction cost involved
in changing from one judicial doctrine to another.25 3 This cost
originates in the time and effort it takes to work out wrinkles in a
new doctrine. In some measure, that cost may reflect the degree of
difficulty of a new doctrine, but introducing even the most straight-
forward doctrine will impose some transaction cost based simply on
change itself. Returning to Swift, however, with its base of experi-
ence in those 1000 cases, should reduce such transaction costs sub-
stantially. The old cases will obviously not be as valuable as a more
recent body of precedent, but their utility in reducing the cost of a
change from Erie to Swift should not be underrated.
b. Confusion under Swift
Even if the existing Swift precedent has value, there will be costs
involved in applying Swift. If Swift is restored in its original form,
the uncertainty of which Justice Brandeis complained would remain
a real cost.2 54 Determining when a court could apply federal com-
mon law, and when it must defer to state statute or state judicial
decisions construing statutes, as Swift required,255 will remain a net-
tlesome problem. Nevertheless, our fifty years of experience with
Erie's difficulties should suggest that the difficulty of applying Swift
now seems comparatively more manageable. In fact, it may even be
possible to strip away some of the uncertainty associated with one of
Swift's exceptions.
252. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 n.8 (referring to Brandeis' list of 1000 cases involving distinc-
tions between federal and state law); Warren, New Light, supra note 33, at 89 (discussing uncer-
tainty caused by attempts to apply Swift to diversity cases).
253. See supra notes 69-88 and accompanying text (demonstrating evolution of applying
Rule 3 as example of unpredictability).
254. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (describing uncertainty caused by Swift doctrine as result of
impossibility of discovering satisfactory line between province of federal common law and
state common law).
255. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (holding that decisions of federal
courts should normally apply unless there is specific state interest and action by state in area
of controversy being reviewed).
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Recall that, under Swift, there were two important exceptions to
the general practice of allowing federal courts hearing diversity
cases to apply federal general common law. 256 The one exception
arose in cases addressing "rights and titles to things having a per-
manent locality," i.e., real estate.2 57 Determining when a case ad-
dresses issues of realty, subject to state common law, was part of the
cost of uncertainty Swift imposed.
2 58
In fact, in the Black & White case that was so important to the
emergence of Erie,259 Justice Holmes cited this Swift exception as an
additional reason why the case should not be governed by federal
general common law. 26 0 Given current views of the constitutional
power of the Federal Government to regulate matters that once
might have been reserved to the states, it is plausible to consider
whether the real estate exception justice Story created in Swift could
be eliminated so that, in all common law matters, federal courts
could fashion federal general common law. 26' If that is practical, it
would reduce by a significant amount the cost of uncertainty in Swift.
c. Damage to federalism?
As we have already seen, part of the problem in choosing between
Swift and Erie can be placed in a larger context that contemplates the
proper balance between state and federal power in our judicial sys-
tem.262 Erie represents a growth of state authority, while Swift favors
the federal side.263 In that sense, restoring Swift might be seen to
impose a cost in federal/state relations because any shift of power
from one side to another necessarily creates winners and losers.
That cost, however, may be smaller than it first appears to be.
Among Swift's original assumptions was the expectation that fed-
256. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 17-18 (stating that issues involving positive statutes of state, con-
struction of statutes adopted by local tribunals, and matters immovable and intra-territorial in
nature are exceptions to application of federal common law).
257. Id at 17.
258. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 n.8 (stating that although Swift was attempt to promote uniform-
ity in business transactions, it gave rise to unpredictability because businessmen could not
know in advance when doctrine would be applied).
259. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text (noting that Justice Brandeis' dissent
in Black & White raised issue of inequity which would become key critique of Swift).
260. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535-36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that state courts should
have final authority for questions of state authority to act).
261. See Weinberg, supra note 215, at 844 (arguing that courts have ability to make legisla-
tion "less arbitrary, unfair, or partial" while remaining subject to power of revision by politi-
cally accountable Congress).
262. See supra notes 200-14 and accompanying text (discussing federal courts' lack of ac-
countability to states).
263. See Freer, supra note 5, at 1101 (naming Swift as high water mark of"federal hegem-
ony in vertical choice of law" and Erie as ending "federal reign").
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eral courts empowered to create common law for diversity cases
would thereby help the state courts achieve better and more uni-
form common law of their own. 264 Justice Story, however, never in-
tended that Swift would strip the states of any choice but to accept
federal general common law. By requiring federal courts to defer to
state statutes and to state judicial decisions construing those stat-
utes, 265 Justice Story left open the possibility that states could not
only continue to use their own common law, but also force federal
courts to adopt the same view of an issue as the state held.266 In
other words, if a state disagreed with the view of a question that
federal courts adopted, the state could restore its own view by en-
acting legislation which, under Swift, the federal courts would be
compelled to follow.
State legislatures may not follow this practice often. They would,
however, have the option available to them if the decision of a fed-
eral court in a diversity case addressed an item of particular sensitiv-
ity to the state. In that situation, the democratic process could not
only vindicate itself but also ensure that the federal/state balance
was not overthrown. While returning to Swift would alter the cur-
rent balance of federal/state relations imposed by Erie, any diminu-




Swift was subject to criticism because it encouraged forum shop-
ping. Undeniably, that is a cost associated with returning to the
older doctrine. While the Supreme Court has accepted forum shop-
ping as an acceptable cost when associated with improvement in
264. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (stating that Brandeis' critique of Swift
included attack on Swifts failure to bring about uniformity among states).
265. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (focusing on deference to state law when
ruling on issues dealing with in-state constitutions or of intra-state or immovable character).
266. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18 (stating that decisions of state courts will "receive, the most delib-
erate attention and respect").
267. For those indoctrinated in the power of the Federal Government under the
Supremacy Clause, it might be jarring to contemplate state legislation nullifying a federal
judicial decision. Where the federal authority itself permits parallel state action, however, the
Supremacy Clause is not implicated. Cf JOHN NOWAK ET AL., CONSTrrTUTONAL LAW 295-96 (3d
ed. 1986) (arguing that judiciary has shouldered burden of discovering congressional intent
and striking down state laws when appropriate, though Congress can declare that it did not
intend to preempt area). Swift's deferral to state legislation may not be compelling authority
becauseJustice Story was proceeding on the assumption that judicial declarations of law were
not themselves law, but only evidence of what the laws were. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 17 (stating
that judge-made laws were often re-examined, reversed or qualified when found defective or
ill-founded). That assumption might not carry much weight today. It would seem, however,
that a restored Swift doctrine could contain a declaration that it would defer to state legisla-
tion, and that such a declaration would be effective.
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other areas, 26 8-and has even tolerated forum shopping in order to
protect Erie itself269-it does not follow inevitably that the cost of
increased opportunities to shop for fora should also be accepted in
order to return to Swift. Reasonable people may still consider this
cost sufficient to justify retaining Erie.270 Others may conclude that
the costs imposed by Erie outweigh this advantage Erie may enjoy
over Swift.2 71 Most important, however, is a recognition that, even if
one believes that Erie retains some advantage over Swift in prevent-
ing forum shopping, the advantage is smaller than Justice Brandeis
could have contemplated.
3. Better law
Law should produce benefits. If Swift merely cost less than Erie,
but produced no positive benefits of its own, it would be hard to
justify reconsidering Swift. The old doctrine is useful, however, and
offers the possibility of helping to develop better law. Swift has such
potential because, other things being equal, two minds working on a
question are more likely to produce a satisfactory answer than a sin-
gle mind working alone. This proposition is sufficiently obvious so
that one vignette may be sufficient to demonstrate the point.
In Erie, the federal district court had a choice between the law of
Pennsylvania and the federal general common law that had devel-
oped in the wake of Swift.272 Pennsylvania law at that time still de-
termined the liability of landowners to persons injured on their land
by placing plaintiffs in one of several categories.273 In Erie, Penn-
sylvania law would have labeled the plaintiff a trespasser, to whom
no duty of care was owed.2 7 4 Under federal common law, the de-
fendant would have breached its duty of care to plaintiff.2 75
Developments in the law of torts since Erie have tended to vindi-
cate the federal position.2 76 While many states still determine the
duty owed based on the plaintiff's status as an invitee, licensee, or
268. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (considering growth of in personam
jurisdiction and resulting greater choice of fora).
269. See supra notes 166-86 and accompanying text (stating that Supreme Court is willing
to tolerate one type of forum shopping to avoid another).
270. See Brummett, Note, supra note 5, at 109 (validating scope of Erie doctrine while ad-
vocating inapplicability to foreign-country judgments).
271. See Freer, supra note 5, at 1141-42 (stating that courts have found their way around
Erie and have continued to avoid state law).
272. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
273. See id. at 70 (stating that courts of Pennsylvania had established rule regarding per-
sons who use railroad pathways which determined whether person was trespasser).
274. Id.
275. See id. (stating that under federal common law, operators of railroads owe duty of
care to public when public has made open and notorious use of railroad's right of way).
276. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 433 (5th ed, 1984)
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trespasser, a number of other states have moved toward the federal
position as it existed prior to Eyie. 277 Admittedly, even if all the
states had thrown in the towel and adopted the old federal position
entirely, it would not prove that federal common law was correct or
Pennsylvania law less just. The changes in state law that have oc-
curred, however, suggest at the least that the federal courts have
something to contribute to the making of common law for diversity
cases. 278 Swift encouraged this contribution while Erie stifles it.
4. More uniform law
Other scholars have already demonstrated that, when progress to-
ward uniformity is measured realistically, Swift can be seen as having
performed an important function. 279 It was never in the cards that
the states would generally adopt uniform positions on common law.
The disparate state positions on duties owed to trespassers on land,
which have developed in the wake of Swift's demise, demonstrate
clearly that the states are unlikely ever to achieve truly uniform posi-
tions on some large bodies of law. That is not the same, however, as
saying that state courts are beyond influence when a better ap-
proach is presented to them. Where federal courts create such an
approach, it is likely to help move state courts toward adopting
more nearly similar positions. Such modest pressures favoring har-
monization of law are a great deal less than Justice Brandeis appar-
ently expected from Swift when he suggested it had failed to
produce uniformity. 280 They may, however, be as much as one
should expect in a truly federal system. In fact, the evidence of
(showing movement of state courts to abolish categories of occupiers of land as basis for
determining duty of care owed individuals by owners of property).
277. Id at 432-34.
278. Erie, of course, did not entirely preclude a contribution by federal courts to state
common law. Federal courts hearing issues in which state common law was uncertain have
often felt free to estimate for themselves what the state law was or should be. See supra note 67
and accompanying text (arguing that such estimation results in little more than federal court
guesswork). Under Swift, however, federal courts would not have to wait for the less frequent
case in which state law was uncertain, and could adopt federal common law simply because it
was perceived to be better than the state alternative.
279. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (arguing that although Swift did not
result in immediate change, it exerted subtle pressure on state courts to move toward uni-
formity); see also Saunders, supra note 5, at 666 (indicating Swift created federal-state proce-
dural uniformity); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 803 (1985) (stating that Swift regime created uniformity in law
in federal courts and limited forum shopping at federal level); Craig A. Hoover, Note, Defer-
ence to Federal Circuit Court Interpretations of Unsettled State Law: Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 1982 DUKE LJ. 704, 704-05 (showing Swift's creation of state/federal law dichotomy and
failure of Erie to provide effective method for ascertaining unsettled state law).
280. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (focusing on problem of state court persistence in applying
own opinions to questions of common law).
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other scholars suggests such influences are attainable under Swift. 2 8 1
D. Swift and State Courts
The end of Erie, of course, does not mean the end of the power of
state courts to create common law or construe statutes. Even under
Swift, federal courts were supposed to accord deference to state
common law before creating their own.28 2 Swift also made clear that
when state courts construed a state statute, their interpretations re-
ceived deference and more: federal courts had no authority to create
law in conflict with state court interpretations of state statutes.283
Thus, while a return to Swift undercuts somewhat the authority of
state courts in the area of "pure" common law, it is important not to
overstate its impact on the judicial balance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In one sense, law is a lot like diplomacy: success and failure are
rarely delineated by clear bright lines, but rather by nuances and
shades of grey. If it does not often appear that way in judicial opin-
ions, it may only be because judges, being human, are inclined to
organize with care the arguments that support their position, giving
lesser shrift to contrary views.
The reality, however, is that more often than not good arguments
can be made for alternative positions. Or, less happily, that no com-
pelling argument can be made for any particular position because
each alternative is afflicted with one weakness or another. In either
of those circumstances, the preferred position is the one that, on
balance, has the most to offer, even allowing for its weaknesses. In
fact, it may be that, when an idea seems to come replete with advan-
tages and free of drawbacks, it should be viewed with the suspicion
once reserved for itinerant peddlers of patent medicine.
Choosing between Swift and Erie is also difficult because the
choice is so stark. If those are the only choices, students of the
281. See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1513, 1532 (1984) (stating that federal
courts are in good position to influence state court rulings); Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of
Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv.
369, 413 (1992) (asserting most states have adopted procedural and evidentiary rules akin to
rules found in federal courts); John W. Osborne, Judicial/Technical Assessment ofNovel Sdentific
Evidence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 542 (demonstrating traditional influence of federal courts
on state courts in areas of evidence law).
282. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18.
283. See id. at 17-18 (holding that federal common law applies only in areas of more gen-




problem are necessarily driven to one pole or the other. That is
something which might make many of us instinctively uncomforta-
ble. While writing this Article, I have tried to imagine what a modi-
fication of Erie involving only a partial return to Swift would look
like. Candor requires a confession that I have been unable to de-
velop a plausible third choice.
Obviously that does make the quest for such an alternative unde-
sirable. Something that reduced the cost of Erie while retaining its
benefit in discouraging a particular form of forum shopping would
greatly improve current law. Then, selfishly, I will claim the addi-
tional consolation of having played a small catalytic role in its
development.
28 4
In the absence of a happy third choice, however, the alternatives
of Swift and Erie are typical of some of the sober decisions we must
make in the law. In the eyes of many, not the least of which includes
the eyes of the Supreme Court, Swift retains its disadvantage of en-
couraging forum shopping within a state and still seems, somehow,
unfair. These problems should look substantially less severe, how-
ever, particularly when viewed against the forum shopping opportu-
nities already offered to plaintiffs in other contexts. Moreover, the
costs of Erie-particularly those associated with learning the doc-
trine, applying the doctrine, and predicting the outcome-outweigh
the costs of its alternatives.
Whether through legislation that resolves the ambiguity in the
Rules of Decision Act that both Justice Story and Charles Warren
exploited, or through Supreme Court reconsideration of Erie itself,
the time seems long past to accept the costs of Erie stoically. If re-
consideration produces, as it should, a decision to cast Erie adrift,
clearly it will not produce civil procedure nirvana-Swift will still
have disadvantages. But at least we may have reduced the problems
in this difficult area. If that happened, it might also take away one
ground for the suspicion that civil procedure students have about
the motives of their professors. Of course, nonmutual collateral es-
toppel would still remain.
284. However, if further musing produces something that looks like a plausible alterna-
tive, it will appear in another Article.
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